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THE CASE AGAINST FEDERALIZING TRADE SECRECY
Christopher B. Seaman *
ABSTRACT

T

RADE secrecy is unique among the major intellectual property (“IP”)
doctrines because it is governed primarily by state law. Recently, however, a number of influential actors—including legislators, academics,
high-technology firms, and organizations representing IP attorneys and
owners—have supported the creation of a private civil cause of action for
trade secret misappropriation under federal law. Proponents assert that
federalizing trade secrecy would provide numerous benefits, including substantive uniformity, the availability of a federal forum for misappropriation
litigation, and the creation of a unified national regime for IP rights.
This Article engages in the first systematic critique of the claim that federalizing trade secrecy is normatively desirable. Ultimately, it concludes that
there are multiple reasons for trade secrecy to remain primarily the province of state law, including preservation of the states’ ability to engage in
limited experimentation regarding the scope of trade secret protection and
federalization’s potential negative impact on the disclosure of patenteligible inventions. Finally, it proposes an alternative approach—a modest
expansion of federal courts’ jurisdiction over state law trade secret
claims—that can help address the issue of trade secret theft without requiring outright federalization.
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (“IP”) theft is estimated to cost U.S. firms billions of dollars annually. 1 Much of this loss is due to misappropriation
of trade secrets by foreign actors and entities. 2 For instance, alleged
cyber-espionage by members of China’s People’s Liberation Army
(“PLA”) Unit 61398 has received widespread press coverage due to the
scale of the conduct and value of the proprietary information allegedly

1

See Comm’n on the Theft of Am. Intellectual Prop., The IP Commission Report 1 (2013),
available at http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_052213.pdf (“The scale of
international theft of American intellectual property (IP) is unprecedented—hundreds of billions of dollars per year . . . .”); Office of the Nat’l Counterintelligence Exec., Foreign Spies
Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009–2011, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.ncix.gov/
publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf [hereinafter ONCIX
Report] (“Estimates from academic literature on the losses from economic espionage
range . . . from $2 billion to $400 billion or more a year . . . .”).
2
See Comm’n on the Theft of Am. Intellectual Prop., supra note 1, at 15 (“For almost all
categories of IP theft, currently available evidence and studies suggest that between 50% and
80% of the problem, both globally and in the United States, can be traced back to China.”);
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy, Inv. No. 332-519, USITC Pub. 4226, at xiv
(May 2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf (estimating that
in 2009, U.S. firms lost between $14.2 billion and $90.5 billion due to IP infringement in
China); see also Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exec. Office of the President,
2013 Special 301 Report 4–6 (2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
05012013%202013%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf (identifying forty-one countries as
deficient in IP enforcement).
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stolen. 3 At the same time, technological developments like the digitization of business records, widespread use of portable electronic devices,
and cloud computing have rendered U.S. businesses more vulnerable to
electronic means of trade secret theft. 4 Moreover, the scope of this problem is growing, potentially undermining domestic businesses, placing
American jobs at risk, and ultimately threatening the health of the U.S.
economy. 5
In response, government officials, academics, and others have proposed a variety of measures to counter the growing problem of trade secret theft. 6 One of these is the creation of a civil cause of action for trade
secret misappropriation under federal law. 7 Trade secrecy is unique
among the major forms of IP because it is not governed primarily by
federal law. 8 Unlike patents and copyrights, trade secrecy is a creature of
state law, arising out of state court decisions in the nineteenth century to
3
See David E. Sanger et al., China’s Army Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S., N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 2013, at A1; see also Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units 3, 25 (2013), available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_
Report.pdf (asserting that PLA Unit 61398 electronically infiltrated dozens of organizations
and accessed a “broad range of information from its victims,” including product development information, manufacturing procedures, business plans, and other valuable data). In
May 2014, five members of PLA Unit 61398 were charged with violations of U.S. federal
criminal law for trade secret misappropriation and identity theft involving domestic firms,
including U.S. Steel, Westinghouse Electric, and Alcoa. Indictment at 3–4, 6–7, 43, 47,
United States v. Wang Dong, Crim. No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014); see also Michael S.
Schmidt & David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks, N.Y.
Times, May 20, 2014, at A1 (reporting on the indictment).
4
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Administration Strategy on
Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets 8 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2013/02/19/launch-administration-s-strategy-mitigate-theft-us-trade-secrets.
5
Id. at 1; see also Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 2, at 13 (“The theft
of trade secrets and other forms of economic espionage, which results in significant costs to
U.S. companies and threatens the economic security of the United States, appears to be escalating.”).
6
See Comm’n on the Theft of Am. Intellectual Prop., supra note 1, at 4–7, 63–84 (detailing a variety of short, medium, and long-term proposals to address international IP theft);
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 4, at 3–12 (identifying action items to address trade
secret theft); see also infra Section II.B (describing proposed legislation regarding trade secret misappropriation).
7
See Comm’n on the Theft of Am. Intellectual Prop., supra note 1, at 73 (proposing “a
private civil cause of action under the [Economic Espionage Act]”).
8
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (“Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection.”); David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 769, 770 (2009) (“Trade secrets stand alone as the
only major type of intellectual property governed primarily by state law.”).
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become an important source of protection against the improper acquisition, disclosure, and use of commercially valuable information that has
been maintained in confidence. 9 And unlike trademarks, which also
originally arose under state law but now are primarily protected under
the federal Lanham Act, 10 trade secrecy has largely maintained its state
law status, 11 despite recent encroachment by federal statutory law. 12
Proponents have offered several justifications for federalizing trade
secret law. First, they contend a federal statute would create substantive
uniformity in trade secret law. 13 Second, they assert that it would provide the advantages of a federal forum for litigating trade secret misappropriation claims. 14 Third, they suggest that federal legislation is required to comply with the United States’s obligations under international
trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”). 15 Finally, they argue that federalization of
trade secrecy would better promote innovation by creating a unified national IP regime. 16
This Article engages in the first systematic critique of proponents’ arguments that federalizing trade secrecy is normatively desirable. First,
proponents’ concerns regarding the purported lack of substantive uniformity in state law are largely overstated. Forty-seven states have
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), which provides a
common foundation for state trade secret law. 17 In addition, federalizing
9
See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 241, 247 (1998) (“Since its emergence in the middle of the nineteenth
century, trade secret law has developed primarily as a creature of state common law.”); Mark
A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 Stan. L. Rev.
311, 315 (2008) (“While patent and copyright law were well established . . . by the founding
of the Republic, . . . trade secret law in its modern form in Anglo-American jurisprudence is
a common law creation of the nineteenth century.”).
10
Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1141n (2012)); see Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 585, 595–600 (2008) (reviewing the history of the Lanham Act and
expansion of trademark protection by federal law).
11
See infra Section I.A.
12
See infra Section I.B.
13
See infra text accompanying notes 238–44.
14
See infra text accompanying notes 344–50.
15
See infra text accompanying notes 377–80.
16
See infra text accompanying notes 393–96.
17
Unif. Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 536–659 (2005) [hereinafter UTSA]; see also infra
Appendix A (listing the jurisdictions that have adopted the UTSA).
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trade secrecy likely would not accomplish proponents’ goal of uniformity, particularly if the legislation does not preempt parallel state trade secret law. 18 Moreover, there are benefits to a decentralized approach that
permits states to engage in a limited degree of experimentation regarding
the scope of trade secret protection. 19 Second, although there are advantages to litigating trade secret claims in federal court, a federal forum
is already available in many trade secret cases. 20 Third, existing state
law regarding trade secret protection already substantially complies with
relevant international agreements. 21 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, federalizing trade secrecy may undermine patent law’s objective
of promoting the disclosure and widespread dissemination of information regarding new inventions because it will likely cause more inventors to opt out of the patent system. 22
The balance of this Article is organized into five parts. Part I traces
trade secrecy’s state law origins and development, as well as the growing scope of federal law regarding trade secrecy to provide a foundation
for understanding the current state of play in this area. Part II presents
recent calls for federal trade secret protections and analyzes pending legislation in Congress intended to accomplish this goal. Part III contends
that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to create a private civil cause of action to combat trade secret misappropriation, at
least in most circumstances. Part IV offers a detailed critique of four key
arguments that have been advanced in favor of federalizing trade secrecy. Finally, Part V proposes an alternative approach—a modest expansion of federal courts’ jurisdiction over state law trade secret claims—
that can help address the harms of trade secret theft without requiring
outright federalization.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE SECRET LAW
This Part chronicles the development of trade secret law, starting with
its origins at common law in the nineteenth century. It then traces several efforts in the twentieth century to harmonize state law regarding trade
secrecy, culminating with the promulgation and widespread adoption of

18

See infra Subsection IV.A.3.
See infra Subsection IV.A.4.
20
See infra Section IV.B.
21
See infra Section IV.C.
22
See infra Section IV.D.
19
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the UTSA. Finally, it discusses the limited but growing body of federal
statutory law related to trade secrecy.
A. State Law
1. Common Law Origins
Trade secrecy is the youngest sibling of the major IP doctrines, arising from the common law during the first half of the nineteenth century. 23 The recognition of trade secret misappropriation as an independent
cause of action coincided with the Industrial Revolution. 24 In preindustrial economies, the proprietary knowledge needed to practice a trade or
craft often was passed from a master to an apprentice. 25 In turn, the apprentice was contractually required to keep secret the know-how learned
from the master. 26 This restriction lasted for only the duration of the apprenticeship; afterward, the apprentice could “freely depart with whatever skill and knowledge [he] had acquired.” 27
Mass industrialization undermined this contract-based protection for
proprietary information. The concentration of production in large factories greatly diminished the master-apprentice model, 28 creating a mobile
labor force not bound by any secrecy obligations. 29 At the same time, the
23
See Elizabeth A. Rowe & Sharon K. Sandeen, Cases and Materials on Trade Secret Law
14 (2012) (“From the late 1860s through 1988, trade secret law in the United States was
primarily governed by common law . . . .”); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2007) (“Trade secrets owe their origination to
the common law.”).
24
See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. a (1995) (“The modern law of
trade secrets evolved in England in the early 19th century, apparently in response to the
growing accumulation of technical know-how and the increased mobility of employees during the industrial revolution.”).
25
Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 Hastings L.J. 441,
451 (2001); see also W.J. Rorabaugh, The Craft Apprentice: From Franklin to the Machine
Age in America 32–33 (1986) (discussing the transfer of knowledge from master to apprentice).
26
Fisk, supra note 25, at 451 & n.23; see also S.R. Epstein, Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship,
and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe, 58 J. Econ. Hist. 684, 694 (1998) (explaining that “the standard oath sworn by an early modern London apprentice stipulated that
he ‘his said master faithfully his secrets keep’” (footnote omitted)).
27
Fisk, supra note 25, at 450.
28
Id. at 451.
29
See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. a (1995) (noting “the increased mobility of employees during the industrial revolution”); Margo E.K. Reder &
Christine Neylon O’Brien, Managing the Risk of Trade Secret Loss Due to Job Mobility in
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technological developments that enabled the Industrial Revolution often
were readily observable to employees in the factories and mills where
they worked. 30 Thus, a new source of protection was needed.
The first reported trade secret case occurred in England, the birthplace
of the Industrial Revolution, in 1817. 31 Protection for trade secrecy migrated to the United States two decades later, when the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts granted specific performance of a contractual
agreement regarding the “exclusive use” of a secret method for making
chocolate. 32 Subsequently, numerous state courts recognized a propertylike interest in trade secret information and granted injunctive relief to
prevent its unauthorized disclosure or use. 33
2. Restatement (First) of Torts
By the early 1900s, many of the core concepts of trade secrecy had
been established through case law: 34 The holder of a trade secret was required to take precautions to preserve its secrecy, 35 but this secrecy did
not have to be absolute. 36 Information generally known to the public
could not qualify as a trade secret. 37 And an obligation not to disclose or

an Innovation Economy with the Theory of Inevitable Disclosure, 12 J. High Tech. L. 373,
386 (2012) (“The modern concept of trade secret law developed in response to employees’
increased mobility during the Industrial Revolution.” (footnote omitted)).
30
See Doron S. Ben-Atar, Trade Secrets: Intellectual Piracy and the Origins of American
Industrial Power 90–93, 104–09 (2004) (discussing American efforts to recruit European
factory and mill employees in an attempt to bring technological developments to the United
States).
31
Newbery v. James, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch.) 1011–12; 2 Mer. 446, 446–50; see
also 1 Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law § 2:2 (2013) (“A secret formula for treating gout
was the subject of a legal battle which resulted in what appears to be the first reported trade
secret case in England: Newbery v. James.” (footnote omitted)).
32
Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 525–27 (1837).
33
See Donald S. Chisum et al., Understanding Intellectual Property Law § 3B[2], at 203–
06 (2d ed. 2011) (summarizing nineteenth century and early twentieth century trade secret
decisions).
34
See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. a (1995) (“In the United
States . . . by the end of the [nineteenth] century the principal features of contemporary trade
secret law were well established.”); 1 Jager, supra note 31, § 2:3, at 2–17 (noting that “[t]he
common law of trade secrets was . . . developing rapidly in the United States”).
35
See, e.g., O. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72 N.W. 140, 142 (Mich. 1897).
36
See, e.g., Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 461 (1868); Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Standard Steel Car Co., 60 A. 4, 9 (Pa. 1904).
37
See, e.g., Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 13-23 Ohio C.C. Dec. 468, 470–71 (1902),
aff’d, 70 N.E. 1127 (Ohio 1903); 1 Jager, supra note 31, § 2:3, at 2–17.
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use proprietary information was enforceable through an injunction. 38 But
trade secret law did not develop uniformly because of the nature of the
common law process. For example, some state courts issued numerous
published decisions to provide guidance, while others had few binding
precedents on trade secret issues.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) embarked on an ambitious project to clarify, harmonize, and, in some cases,
shape the development of the common law though various Restatements
of the Law. 39 The ALI addressed trade secrets in Sections 757–58 of the
Restatement (First) of Torts (“Restatement”), published in 1939. Although these sections are relatively brief, they articulate some basic principles that were highly influential in shaping trade secret law. 40
Section 757 of the Restatement defined a trade secret as “any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s
business, and which gives [the business] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” 41 In addition, as
suggested by the word “secret,” the Restatement provided that “a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that [the relevant information
would be difficult to acquire], except by the use of improper means.” 42
The Restatement further provided that misappropriation included acquisition of the secret through “improper means,” as well as through disclosure or use of the secret in violation of a duty of confidence. 43
The Restatement “served as the primary source for an understanding
of trade secret law for at least 50 years.” 44 Despite this, it was criticized
38

See, e.g., Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 110, 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892),
aff’d sub nom. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reighenbach, 29 N.Y.S. 1143 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1894);
Fralich v. Despar, 30 A. 521, 521–22 (Pa. 1894).
39
John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 615, 616–19
(1998); see also Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American
Law Institute, 15 Iowa L. Rev. 19, 26–27 (1929) (explaining that the Restatement drafters
sometimes “adopt[ed] a minority rule, hoping to direct the stream of decisions in this manner
by using its influence and authority in the judicial community”).
40
See Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 277, 282
(1980) (noting that despite its limitations, “the Restatement greatly contributed to the evolution of trade secrets law”).
41
Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939).
42
Id.
43
Id. § 757(a)–(c).
44
Rowe & Sandeen, supra note 23, at 27; see also Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of
Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, 33 Hamline L. Rev. 493, 502 (2010) [hereinafter Sandeen, The Evolution
of Trade Secret Law] (“Between 1939 and 1988, the Restatement First was the primary
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for not harmonizing the laws governing trade secrecy. 45 This was due in
part to the inherent limitations of the Restatement project, which “depend[ed] upon its adoption by courts for its ultimate efficacy.” 46 In addition, “the slow pace and frequently inconsistent development of the
common law” hindered harmonization. 47 For instance, Wyoming did not
recognize an express cause of action for trade secret misappropriation
until 2006. 48
3. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
A new attempt to harmonize trade secret law was launched in the late
1960s. 49 This effort culminated with the promulgation of the UTSA by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
UTSA’s drafters sought to create “unitary definitions of trade secret and
trade secret misappropriation,” 50 as well as to codify basic principles
that had been developed through case law. 51 Thus, the UTSA “represent[s] the first major attempt to legislate trade secrets misappropriation[,] rather than to leave it in the hands of the courts.” 52

source for an understanding of the purpose and meaning of trade secret law in the United
States.” (footnote omitted)).
45
See UTSA, supra note 17, at prefatory note (“Notwithstanding the commercial importance of state trade secret law . . . its development [has been] uneven.”); Rowe &
Sandeen, supra note 23, at 27 (“[B]eginning in the 1960s, concern was expressed by legal
commentators and the practicing bar that trade secret law was not developing in a consistent
fashion . . . .”).
46
Klitzke, supra note 40, at 283.
47
Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law, supra note 44, at 502.
48
See Briefing.com v. Jones, 2006 WY 16, ¶¶ 10, 16, 126 P.3d 928, 934, 936 (Wyo. 2006)
(noting that “Wyoming is the only jurisdiction in the United States that has not given specific legislative or judicial recognition to a tort cause of action for misuse of trade secrets,” but
concluding that “[t]he common law cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets . . . is part of the common law in the State of Wyoming”). Shortly after this decision,
the Wyoming legislature enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-24101 to -110 (2013).
49
UTSA, supra note 17, at prefatory note.
50
Id.
51
Klitzke, supra note 40, at 284; see also Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 427, 432–33 (1995) (“The National Conference’s
intent in proposing the UTSA was not to revolutionize the standards for trade secret misappropriation, but to codify existing common law standards and to provide a uniform approach
to trade secret misappropriation among the states.” (footnote omitted)).
52
Pace, supra note 51, at 433.

SEAMAN_BOOK (PRE-ENHANCED) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy

4/7/2015 2:19 PM

327

Like the Restatement, the UTSA requires both “the existence of a
‘trade secret’” and an act of “‘misappropriation’ before liability attaches.” 53 The UTSA defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 54

Misappropriation exists under the UTSA when a party learns a trade
secret with knowledge or reason to know that it was acquired through
“improper means.” 55 “‘Improper means’ includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means,” 56 as well as
“otherwise lawful conduct which is improper under the circumstances.” 57 In addition, the UTSA identifies several proper means that do not
qualify as misappropriation, including independent invention, reverse
engineering, and “observation of the [alleged secret] in public use or on
public display.” 58
Misappropriation also exists when a party discloses or uses a trade secret without consent if the party:
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
his knowledge of the trade secret was

53
Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 Ohio St.
L.J. 1633, 1653 (1998).
54
UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(4).
55
Id. § 1(2)(i).
56
Id. § 1(1).
57
Id. § 1 cmt.
58
Id. “Reverse engineering is the process of [starting] with [a] known product and
work[ing] backward to divine the process that aided in its development or manufacture.”
Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 853, 912 n.305 (2002)
(citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974)).
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(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change [in] position, knew or had reason to know
that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by
accident or mistake

“Actual or threatened [trade secret] misappropriation may be enjoined” under the UTSA, but injunctive relief must terminate when the
“commercial advantage . . . from the misappropriation” has ended. 59 If
the grant of a prohibitive injunction is unreasonable, a reasonable royalty can be awarded instead to compensate for future uses of the secret. 60
Damages can be recovered for the “actual loss caused by [the] misappropriation” and any “unjust enrichment . . . that is not taken into account” in calculating actual loss. 61 In addition, punitive damages and attorney’s fees may be awarded for willful and malicious
misappropriation. 62 Finally, the original version of the UTSA preempted
“conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law . . . pertaining to civil liability for misappropriation of a trade secret” 63 and imposed a three-year
statute of limitations for asserting misappropriation. 64
In 1985, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted several amendments, all relatively minor, to the UTSA. 65
First, a reasonable royalty was permitted in lieu of a prohibitive injunction only in “exceptional circumstances.” 66 In addition, the UTSA’s
preemption clause was altered to clarify that claims for breach of con-

59

Id. § 2(a).
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 2(b) (1979) (amended 1985) [hereinafter UTSA (1979)].
61
UTSA, supra note 17, § 3(a).
62
Id. §§ 3(b), 4.
63
UTSA (1979), supra note 60, § 7(a).
64
UTSA, supra note 17, § 6. Eight of the forty-seven jurisdictions that have enacted the
UTSA have modified the statute of limitations period. See Infra Appendix B.
65
For a detailed summary of the history behind the 1985 amendments to the UTSA, see
Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law, supra note 44, at 535–38.
66
UTSA, supra note 17, § 2(b).
60
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tract and related contractual remedies, as well as criminal laws prohibiting misappropriation, were not precluded. 67
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have enacted the
UTSA (either the 1979 original or 1985 amended version) since its
promulgation, 68 with some states modifying portions of the model statute’s provisions. 69 The extent of the UTSA’s adoption is depicted in
Figure I.
Figure I: Adoption of the UTSA (as of Feb. 23, 2015) 70

67

Id. § 7(b).
See infra Appendix A (listing the jurisdictions that have adopted the UTSA and its effective date in each jurisdiction); see also Uniform Law Comm’n, Legislative Enactment Status:
Trade Secrets Act: Enactment Status, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeMap.aspx?title=
Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (indicating that there is legislation pending in Massachusetts). The U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
also adopted the UTSA. Id. For a discussion of whether North Carolina should be counted as
a UTSA jurisdiction, see infra note 247.
69
See Lao, supra note 53, at 1661–65; see also infra notes 253–59 and accompanying text
(discussing states’ modifications of the UTSA).
70
Uniform Law Comm’n, supra note 68.
68
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4. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (“Restatement
(Third)”), promulgated by the ALI in 1995, is analogous to the UTSA in
most respects. Its definition of what constitutes a trade secret is similar
to the UTSA. 71 The scope of the Restatement (Third)’s standard for misappropriation “is intended to be identical with . . . the [UTSA]” as
well. 72 Furthermore, its remedial provisions are generally consistent with
the UTSA. 73
However, the Restatement (Third) has had only a modest impact at
best on the development of trade secret law. Most states have adopted
the UTSA as statutory law and thus the Restatement (Third) is frequently disregarded. 74
B. Federal Law
Although trade secret protection remains governed primarily by state
law, there is a significant body of federal statutory law that is potentially
applicable to trade secret theft.
1. General Criminal Statutes
Prior to 1996, there was no federal criminal law directed specifically
at trade secret misappropriation by private actors. 75 Instead, “federal

71
See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 (1995) (defining a “trade secret” as
“any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that
is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others”); see also id. § 39 cmt. b (“The concept of a trade secret as defined in this Section is
intended to be consistent with the definition of ‘trade secret’ in § 1(4) of the [UTSA].”).
72
Id. § 40 Reporters’ Note cmt. a.
73
Compare UTSA, supra note 17, §§ 2–3, with Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
§§ 44–45 (1995). There are two exceptions. First, the Restatement (Third) does not cap punitive damages like the UTSA. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 45 cmt. i (1995).
Second, the Restatement (Third) does not expressly authorize an award of attorney’s fees. Id.
§ 45 cmt. j.
74
See Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How Medical Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 Tex. Intell.
Prop. L.J. 187, 201 n.76 (2009) (“Whereas the UTSA and [the Restatement] are often read
together by courts as complementary sources of definitional authority, the sections of the
Restatement (Third) . . . that deal with trade secrets are seldom invoked.” (citation omitted)).
75
See Ben Shiffman et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 929, 932
(2012) (“[N]o federal criminal statute dealt directly with the theft of commercial trade secrets until . . . 1996.”). While the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1905–09 (2012), makes it
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prosecutors wanting to charge a defendant with theft of trade secrets had
to utilize other federal criminal statutes.” 76 These included the federal
mail fraud 77 and wire fraud 78 provisions, which “criminalize the use of
the federal mail or interstate wire or electronic communications to execute any scheme to deprive a person of his or her property or money.” 79
Federal prosecutors have pursued numerous claims of stolen trade secrets under these provisions. 80 However, their impact has been limited
because many acts of misappropriation, such as a “faithless employee”
who photocopies documents containing trade secret information and
brings them to a new employer, do not involve use of the mail or electronic communications. 81 In addition, these statutes may not apply when
“trade secret thieves merely copy information” because this “do[es] not
necessarily ‘defraud’ the victims permanently of the data.” 82
Similarly, another federal criminal statute, the National Stolen Property Act (“NSPA”), 83 has been invoked to prosecute the unauthorized
transfer of trade secret information across state or foreign boundaries. 84

a misdemeanor offense for federal officials and employees to publicly disclose trade secret
information learned during their official duties, this law does not apply to private actors.
76
Rowe & Sandeen, supra note 23, at 521; see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. b (1995) (“In some circumstances the appropriation of a trade secret may
also violate the federal wire and mail fraud statutes and the National Stolen Property Act.”
(citations omitted)); Peter J.G. Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Thefts Under Federal Law, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 59, 64 (1994) (“Case law . . . recognizes that under certain circumstances the theft of trade secrets and proprietary information may violate a number of federal
criminal statutes which prohibit the misappropriation of property or goods.”).
77
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
78
Id. § 1343.
79
Francisco J. Morales, Comment, The Property Matrix: An Analytical Tool to Answer
the Question, “Is This Property?”, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1125, 1138 (2013).
80
See, e.g., United States v. Howley, 707 F.3d 575, 579–81 (6th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 153,
155 (4th Cir. 1978); Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310, 311–12 (5th Cir. 1956).
81
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 6–7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4025–
26 (“The mail fraud statute is only applicable when the mails are used to commit the criminal act and the fraud by wire statute requires proof that wire, radio, or television technology
was used to commit the crime.”).
82
James H.A. Pooley, Mark A. Lemley & Peter J. Toren, Understanding the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, 5 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 177, 180 (1997).
83
18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15 (2012).
84
See, e.g., United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 391, 393–94 (2d Cir. 1966) (affirming
criminal convictions under the NSPA when the defendants removed documents describing a
secret drug manufacturing process from their employer’s premises, made copies, and subsequently sold the copies to the employer’s European competitors); see also Pooley, Lemley &
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However, the NSPA only applies if the defendant actually knows a trade
secret has been stolen and then intentionally discloses it to a third party. 85 Furthermore, some courts have held that “[p]urely intellectual
property,” including trade secrets, is not a good, ware, or merchandise
protected by the NSPA. 86
2. The Economic Espionage Act
Due to these statutes’ inherent limitations, 87 as well as the increasing
value of trade secrets to the U.S. economy, 88 Congress enacted the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) in 1996. 89 The EEA protects “trade secrets of all businesses operating in the United States, foreign and domestic alike, from economic espionage and trade secret theft . . . .” 90 It
criminalizes two types of trade secret theft: (1) espionage on behalf of a
foreign entity, 91 and (2) theft of trade secrets for pecuniary gain. 92 These
provisions define “misappropriation” essentially identically, imposing
liability on any individual or entity that:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or
conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates,

Toren, supra note 82, at 179–85 (describing cases in which 18 U.S.C. § 2314 was used to
prosecute the misappropriation of trade secrets).
85
1 Jager, supra note 31, § 4:4.
86
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1991).
87
See S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 10 (1996) (“[N]o Federal law protects proprietary economic
information from theft and misappropriation in a systematic, principled manner. As a result,
prosecutors have had trouble shoe-horning economic espionage into these laws.”); H.R. Rep.
No. 104-788, at 6–7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4025 (“The principal
problem appears to be that there is no federal statute directly addressing economic espionage
or which otherwise protects proprietary information in a thorough, systematic manner.”); see
also Toren, supra note 76, at 96 (explaining the limited reach of pre-Economic Espionage
Act federal criminal statutes).
88
See R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to
the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 7 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 656, 657–58 & n.11
(2008).
89
Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–
32 (2012)).
90
Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 3723, 32 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 2040 (Oct. 14, 1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034, 4034
91
18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2012).
92
Id. § 1832(a).
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transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret; [or]
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to
have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization[.] 93

The EEA also prohibits attempts and conspiracies to commit misappropriation. 94 In addition, the EEA applies to extraterritorial conduct by
U.S. citizens or entities, as well as non-citizens, if “an act in furtherance
of the offense was committed in the United States.” 95
Unlike trade secret misappropriation under state law, the EEA demands proof of unlawful intent. Section 1831, the “foreign espionage”
provision, requires that the misappropriating party intend or know “that
the [misappropriation] will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.” 96 The terms “foreign instrumentality”
and “foreign agent” are narrower than they may appear at first glance.
For example, “[f]oreign companies or individuals do not fall within the
ambit of [S]ection 1831 unless they are ‘substantially owned, controlled,
sponsored, commanded, managed or dominated by a foreign government.’” 97 This interpretation is consistent with Congress’s intent that
Section 1831 target espionage conducted at the behest of foreign governments, not foreign corporations. 98
Section 1832, the “theft of trade secrets” provision, contains three
separate mens rea requirements. 99 Specifically, it requires the defendant
(1) knowingly commit an act of misappropriation; (2) intentionally
“convert a trade secret” to his own or another’s “economic benefit”; and
(3) commit misappropriation with the intent or knowledge that it will
“injure any owner of that trade secret.” 100 It also contains a jurisdictional

93
Id. § 1831(a)(1)–(3); id. § 1832(a)(1)–(3) (containing the same definition with the exception of replacing each instance of “a trade secret” with the phrase “such information”).
94
Id. §§ 1831(a)(4)–(5), 1832(a)(4)–(5).
95
Id. § 1837.
96
Id. § 1831.
97
Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 82, at 197–98 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1839(1)
(2012)).
98
Id. at 198 & n.121.
99
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes 177–82, 185–86 (4th ed.
2013); Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 82, at 199.
100
18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012).
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limitation that the trade secret be “related to a product or service used in
or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce.” 101
Somewhat surprisingly in light of its status as the centerpiece federal
criminal law for trade secret theft, the EEA has not been widely utilized
by federal prosecutors. According to a recent study, the federal government has filed 124 total criminal cases under the EEA as of September
2012, an average of fewer than eight indictments per year. 102 The relative paucity of enforcement actions has caused commentators to call the
EEA a “disappointment” 103 and conclude that it is “not acting as a deterrent against theft of trade secrets.” 104
3. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Another federal statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”), 105 has been used to protect trade secrets that are computeraccessible. Congress originally enacted the CFAA in 1984 as a criminal
antihacking law for “information stored on computers belonging to the

101
Id. This statutory language was recently amended in response to United States v.
Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2012), where the Second Circuit dismissed a § 1832
prosecution against a defendant accused of stealing source code from Goldman Sachs’s highfrequency trading (“HFT”) platform, reasoning that “[b]ecause the HFT system was not designed to enter or pass in commerce, or to make something that does, [the defendant]’s theft
of source code relating to that system was not an offense under the EEA.” In December
2012, Congress enacted the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-236, 126 Stat. 1627 (2012), which broadened § 1832’s scope to include services as well
as products used, or intended for use, in interstate or foreign commerce. See generally Robert Damion Jurrens, Note, Fool Me Once: U.S. v. Aleynikov and the Theft of Trade Secrets
Clarification Act of 2012, 28 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 833 (2013) (discussing the Aleynikov case
and Congress’s subsequent enactment of the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act).
102
Peter J. Toren, An Analysis of Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions: What Companies Can Learn From It and What the Government Should Be Doing About It!, 84 Bloomberg BNA’s Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. 884, 885 (2012); see also Recent Case, Criminal
Law—Economic Espionage—Ninth Circuit Upholds First Trial Conviction Under § 1831 of
the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.—United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815 (9th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, No. 11-1141, 2012 WL 929750 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012), 125 Harv. L. Rev.
2177, 2177 (2012) (“[S]urprisingly few cases have been prosecuted under the [EEA].” (footnote omitted)).
103
Chris Carr et al., The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 Tex. Intell.
Prop. L.J. 159, 199 (2000).
104
Toren, supra note 102, at 886; see also Recent Case, supra note 102, at 2181 (“[F]ederal
prosecutors have taken a markedly tentative approach toward prosecuting § 1831 offenses.”).
105
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
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government and financial institutions.” 106 But in 1994, Congress created
a civil remedy permitting “[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss” due
to a CFAA violation to pursue damages and injunctive relief. 107 In 1996,
Congress further broadened the CFAA’s scope to include any computer
“used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication” 108—which today effectively means any computer capable of connecting to the Internet. 109
The CFAA contains seven categories of prohibited conduct, 110 several
of which can be invoked by trade secret plaintiffs. 111 Section 1030(a)(2)
prohibits anyone from intentionally accessing any protected computer
“without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access,” and “thereby
obtain[ing] . . . information.” 112 Information protected by the CFAA
need not be a trade secret; any proprietary, technical, or business information held on a computer may qualify. 113 In addition, Section
1030(a)(4) prohibits the knowing access of a computer “without authorization, or [that] exceeds authorized access” with the “intent to defraud,”
and “by means of such conduct . . . obtain[ing] anything of value.” 114 Finally, for civil liability, the CFAA requires an additional showing of

106
See Graham M. Liccardi, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle
for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 155, 160
(2008).
107
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
108
Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
109
See, e.g., United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that the accessed computer was “protected” because the defendant “admitted the computers were connected to the Internet”); Nat’l City Bank, N.A. v. Prime Lending, Inc., No.
CV-10-034-EFS, 2010 WL 2854247, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Wash. July 19, 2010) (“[A]ny computer
connected to the internet is a protected computer [under the CFAA].” (citation omitted)); see
also Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two
Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 429, 433 (2009) (explaining
that “given the decentralized nature of computer networks and the Internet, it is difficult to
imagine a functioning, networked computer that does not fit the [CFAA’s] definition” of a
“protected computer” (footnotes omitted)).
110
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(7).
111
See Brenton, supra note 109, at 451 (explaining that “the same allegedly wrongful act
will frequently give rise to both CFAA and UTSA liability”).
112
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). The term “exceeds authorized access” is defined in the CFAA
as “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” Id.
§ 1030(e)(6).
113
Brenton, supra note 109, at 430–31.
114
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). If the object of value is only use of the computer, then the value of this use must exceed $5000 in any one-year period. Id.
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harm to the plaintiff, 115 which can be satisfied by a damage or loss exceeding $5000 in value in a one-year period. 116 This effectively serves as
an amount-in-controversy requirement. 117
4. Section 337of the Tariff Act of 1930
In addition, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 118 (“Section 337”)
has been invoked to combat extraterritorial acts of trade secret misappropriation. The United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”),
an independent federal agency, has authority under Section 337 to conduct investigations of “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts
in the importation . . . or in the sale” of goods in the United States. 119 If a
Section 337 violation is established, the ITC can issue an exclusion order preventing importation of the relevant goods. 120
Section 337 “has evolved into an almost exclusive intellectual property enforcement statute,” primarily for claims of patent infringement. 121
But Section 337 is applicable to trade secret misappropriation as well. In
a recent decision, TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an exclusion order entered under Section 337 for goods manufactured in China using trade secret information misappropriated from an American
company. 122 The complainant in TianRui, Amsted Industries Inc. (“Amsted”), licensed its secret ABC process for making cast steel railway
wheels to a Chinese firm called Datong ABC Castings Company Limited (“Datong”). 123 After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain a license to
the manufacturing technology, another Chinese firm, TianRui Group
115

Id. § 1030(g) (requiring a showing of one of the harms listed in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)–(V)).
116
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).
117
Brenton, supra note 109, at 435.
118
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
119
Id. § 1337(a)(1)(A). For a more detailed explanation of § 337 and the ITC’s administrative enforcement process, see generally William P. Atkins, Appreciating 337 Actions at the
ITC: A Primer on Intellectual Property Issues and Procedures at the U.S. International Trade
Commission, 5 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 103 (1997).
120
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).
121
Atkins, supra note 119, at 104–05; see also Press Release, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
Facts and Trends Regarding USITC Section 337 Investigations 1 (Apr. 15, 2013), available
at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/featured_news/337facts.pdf (“Most Section
337 investigations involve allegations of infringement of patents . . . .”).
122
661 F.3d 1322, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
123
Id. at 1324.
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Company Limited (“TianRui”), hired nine of Datong’s employees, some
of whom had been trained in the secret ABC process. 124
At the ITC, Amsted alleged the former Datong employees improperly
disclosed information to TianRui regarding the secret ABC process and
thereby misappropriated Amsted’s trade secrets. 125 TianRui then partnered with another firm to manufacture railway wheels using the ABC
process and export them to the United States. 126 Amsted argued that
TianRui’s conduct violated Section 337’s prohibition on “[u]nfair methods of competition.” 127 Applying Illinois trade secret law (which is
based on the UTSA), the administrative law judge concluded there was
“overwhelming direct and circumstantial evidence” that TianRui had
misappropriated multiple trade secrets related to the ABC process. 128
Affirming the ITC’s decision, the Federal Circuit held that trade secret misappropriation claims qualify as “unfair competition” under Section 337. 129 Notably, the court rejected the ITC’s application of Illinois
trade secret law, holding that “a single federal standard, rather than the
law of a particular state, should determine what constitutes a misappropriation of trade secrets . . . under [S]ection 337.” 130 Thus, after TianRui,
federal courts and the ITC have the authority to develop a federal common law of trade secrecy for Section 337 violations. 131
Section 337 is a potentially powerful tool against foreign entities that
misappropriate trade secret information and then use that information to
manufacture a product and attempt to export it to the United States. 132
124
Id. In addition, eight of the nine employees had signed confidentiality agreements before leaving Datong to work at TianRui. Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 1325 (alteration in original).
128
Id.
129
Id. at 1326–27 (“The Commission has long interpreted [S]ection 337 to apply to trade
secret misappropriation.” (citation omitted)). But see id. at 1337–38 (Moore, J., dissenting)
(contending that § 337 does not extend to “entirely foreign acts” of misappropriation).
130
Id. at 1327 (majority opinion).
131
Id. (“[W]here the question is whether particular conduct constitutes ‘unfair methods of
competition’ and ‘unfair acts’ in importation, in violation of [S]ection 337, the issue is one
of federal law and should be decided under a uniform federal standard, rather than by reference to a particular state’s tort law.”); see also 19 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4514 (2d ed. Supp. 2014) (explaining that under TianRui, “uniquely
federal interests justify federal common law interpretation of trade secrets under Tariff Act
of 1930”).
132
See P. Andrew Riley & Jonathan R.K. Stroud, A Survey of Trade Secret Investigations
at the International Trade Commission: A Model for Future Litigants, 15 Colum. Sci. &
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The ITC’s authority over trade secret misappropriation claims, however,
is limited in two important ways. First, Section 337 only applies to
goods manufactured abroad and subsequently imported into the United
States; it cannot remedy purely domestic trade secret misappropriation.
Second, Section 337 requires a showing of serious or threatened domestic harm—specifically, the misappropriation must “destroy or substantially injure” a domestic industry, prevent its establishment, or “restrain
or monopolize” commerce in the industry. 133 Despite these requirements, Section 337 is a potentially potent alternative for American firms
to combat foreign trade secret theft.
***
In sum, while there is a substantial body of federal statutory law related to trade secrecy, its coverage is incomplete and is focused primarily
on criminal, rather than civil, remedies. As a result, state law remains the
primary authority for civil trade secret claims. But this may soon
change, as described in the following Part.
II. PROPOSALS TO FEDERALIZE TRADE SECRECY
The idea of a civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation
under federal law is not new. 134 But the increased importance of trade
secrets to the U.S. economy and allegations of widespread trade secret
theft, particularly by foreign actors, have renewed calls for federal action. This Part summarizes the growing concerns regarding trade secret
misappropriation and analyzes several recent proposals to address it.

Tech. L. Rev. 41, 44 (2013) (contending that after TianRui, “savvy companies have sought
to use [the ITC] to protect their domestic U.S. market” and that “the ITC provides the threat
of real litigation backed up by a powerful remedy and broad jurisdiction”).
133
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (2012).
134
See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 27111–12 (1996) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (contending that “available civil remedies may not be adequate to the task” of combating trade secret
theft and asserting that “a Federal civil cause of action is needed”); Margaret M. Blair &
Steven M.H. Wallman, Unseen Wealth: Report of the Brookings Task Force on Intangibles
81 (2001) (“The [Brookings Task Force on Intangibles] recommends that Congress enact a
‘Federal Trade Secret Act’ (FTSA), by virtue of its authority under the Commerce Clause.”);
Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law, supra note 44, at 505–07 (discussing proposed
federal legislation in the 1950s and 1960s to create a statutory cause of action for those injured as a result of unfair competition, such as trade secret theft); Comment, Theft of Trade
Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 396–401 (1971) (calling
for federal legislation with civil and criminal remedies for trade secret misappropriation).
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A. The Growing Threat of Trade Secret Theft and Calls for Federal
Action
Several recent government reports have highlighted the mounting
problem of trade secret misappropriation. In February 2013, a White
House task force on IP enforcement found that “the pace of economic
espionage and trade secret theft against U.S. corporations is accelerating.” 135 It identified information and communications technology, military technology, and fast-growing sectors like pharmaceuticals and clean
energy as targets of foreign espionage. 136 In addition, it explained that
technological developments like digitization of business records, widespread use of portable devices, and cloud computing (that is, storage of
information on remote servers) have made U.S. businesses more vulnerable to electronic means of trade secret misappropriation. 137 The task
force concluded by calling for the review of “existing Federal laws to
determine if legislative changes are needed to enhance enforcement
against trade secret theft.” 138
Similarly, in its annual report on the global state of IP rights and enforcement for 2013, the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) called attention to the issue of trade secret misappropriation by foreign entities. 139 The report raised concerns regarding “the apparent growth of
trade secret theft,” explaining that misappropriation causes “significant
costs to U.S. companies and threatens the economic security of the United States.” 140 The USTR expressed particular concern over trade secret
misappropriation from China, including the “systematic[] infiltrat[ion
of] the computer systems of a significant number of U.S. companies” by
actors affiliated with the Chinese military and government, resulting in
the theft of “hundreds of terabytes of data.” 141
Several key organizations representing IP owners and attorneys have
expressed support for a private federal cause of action for trade secret
135

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 4, at 1.
Id. at 8 (citing ONCIX Report, supra note 1, at 8–9).
137
Id.; see also Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Administration Trade Secret
Strategy Rollout (Feb. 20, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/
2013/ag-speech-1302201.html (“[C]ontinuing technological expansion and accelerating
globalization will lead to a dramatic increase in the threat posed by trade secret theft in the
years ahead.”).
138
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 4, at 11–12.
139
Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., supra note 2, at 13–15.
140
Id. at 13.
141
Id. at 13, 32.
136
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misappropriation. 142 The American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”), a national bar association of IP lawyers, has suggested
creating a “private civil action for the theft of trade secrets by international misappropriation utilizing the existing framework of the
[EEA].” 143 Similarly, the Intellectual Property Owners Association
(“IPO”) has advocated adding “a civil cause of action to the EEA.”144
Former U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) Director David
Kappos has also called for a federal civil cause of action against trade
secret misappropriation. 145
Finally, a number of scholars and practitioners have called for the
adoption of a federal trade secret act. In a widely cited law review article, Professor Marina Lao proposed a federal trade secret act resembling
the UTSA. 146 Likewise, IP attorney R. Mark Halligan has argued that
“we are long overdue for the enactment of a federal trade secrets statute,” 147 and IP attorney David Almeling asserted that federalization “is
the next logical step in the evolution of trade secret law.” 148
B. Proposed Legislation
Several proposals for a federal civil cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation have recently been introduced in Congress. These proposals are: (1) the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014 (“DTSA”); 149 (2)
142
See, e.g., Comm’n on the Theft of Am. Intellectual Prop., supra note 1, at 73 (recommending to “[a]mend the Economic Espionage Act to provide a private right of action for
those who hold trade secrets”).
143
Letter from Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, President, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, to the
Honorable Victoria A. Espinel, U.S. Intellectual Prop. Enforcement Coordinator, Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President 2 (Apr. 22, 2013), available at http://
www.aipla.org/advocacy/executive/Documents/AIPLA%20Letter%20to%20IPEC%20on%2
0Trade%20Secrets%20-%204.22.13.pdf.
144
Letter from Richard F. Phillips, President, Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n, to the Honorable Victoria A. Espinel, U.S. Intellectual Prop. Enforcement Coordinator, Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President 1 (Apr. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0002-0008.
145
David Kappos, Trade Secrets: Promise of Federal Protection Brings New Hope for
Critical IP Law, The Hill (June 30, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/technology/210848-trade-secrets-promise-of-federal-protection-brings-new-hope.
146
Lao, supra note 53, at 1694–95 (“The case for federalizing trade secrets law . . . is compelling.”).
147
Halligan, supra note 88, at 671.
148
Almeling, supra note 8. For another article proposing the adoption of a federal trade
secret act, see generally Pace, supra note 51.
149
S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014).
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the Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014 (“TSPA”); 150 (3) the Private
Right of Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013
(“PRATSA”); 151 and (4) the Future of American Innovation and Research Act of 2013 (“FAIR Act”). 152 Each bill’s key provisions are analyzed below. 153
1. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014
On April 29, 2014, Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) and Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-UT) introduced the DTSA. 154 This bill is a sequel to a proposal
previously co-sponsored by Senator Coons and two other senators in the
previous Congress. 155
The DTSA would create a private civil cause of action for violations
of Sections 1831(a) and 1832(a) of the EEA, as well as for “misappropriation of a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in, or
intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” 156 “Misappropriation” is defined substantively identically to how it is defined in the
UTSA. 157 The bill also clarifies that “reverse engineering” and “independent derivation” are not improper means. 158
The remedial provisions of the DTSA are at least as broad as those
currently existing under state law. Like the UTSA, the bill would authorize injunctive relief for actual or threatened misappropriation, as well as
monetary damages for the actual loss caused by the misappropriation
and any unjust enrichment not included in calculating actual loss. 159 It
also would permit a plaintiff to seek “a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator’s unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret” in lieu of
other damages. 160 In addition, exemplary damages of up to triple the
150

H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014).
H.R. 2466, 113th Cong. (2013).
152
S. 1770, 113th Cong. (2013).
153
The information on the legislation described below is current as of Feb. 22, 2015.
154
S. 2267.
155
See Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th
Cong. (2012).
156
S. 2267 § 2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a)(1)).
157
Compare id. § 2(b)(3) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)) (defining
“misappropriation”), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(2) (defining “misappropriation”). See
also H.R. Rep. No. 113-657, at 5 (2014) (“The bill . . . models its definition of ‘misappropriation’ on the [UTSA].”).
158
S. 2267 § 2(b)(3) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B)).
159
Id. § 2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a)(3)(A), (a)(3)(B)(i)–(ii)).
160
Id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a)(3)(B)(iii)).
151
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amount of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees may be awarded
for a trade secret that has been “willfully or maliciously misappropriated.” 161
One of the more controversial parts of the DTSA is the provision authorizing ex parte applications for the seizure of any property (including
electronic data) that was allegedly “used, in any manner or part, to
commit or facilitate” misappropriation or “for the preservation of evidence in a civil action” under the bill, if the seizure “is necessary to prevent irreparable harm. 162 In a letter to Congress, thirty-one law professors expressed concern about potential misuse of the ex parte seizure
provision, arguing that it could be improperly used as a “weapon of anticompetition.” 163 Other commentators also have highlighted the ex parte
seizure provision as granting significant leverage to trade secret plaintiffs in litigation. 164
The DTSA would impose a five-year statute of limitations period, 165
which is longer than most state trade secret laws. 166 In addition, it would
not preempt other state or federal laws. 167 Original jurisdiction for misappropriation claims would lie in the district courts. 168

161

Id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a)(3)(C)–(D)).
Id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a)(2)(A)).
163
David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the “Defend
Trade Secrets Act of 2014” (S. 2267) and the “Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014” (H.R.
5233) 4–5 (Aug. 26, 2014), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2014/08/professors
%E2%80%99-letter-opposition-%E2%80%9Cdefend-trade-secrets-act-2014%E2%80%9Ds-2267-and-%E2%80%9Ctrade-secrets. The author of this article was a signatory of the professors’ letter.
164
See Business Litigation Update: The Defend Trade Secrets Act: Consequences for
Trade Secret Litigation, Thompson Hine LLP, July 21, 2014, at 2, http://www.
thompsonhine.com/publications/the-defend-trade-secrets-act-consequences-for-trade-secretlitigation (“[P]erhaps most significantly, the [DTSA’s] provision authorizing ex parte orders
to seize electronic and other evidence . . . will likely increase the use of such orders and create a powerful weapon for plaintiffs in trade secret litigation.”); Eric Goldman, Congress is
Considering a New Federal Trade Secret Law. Why?, Forbes, (Sept. 16, 2014, 12:14 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/09/16/congress-is-considering-a-newfederal-trade-secret-law-why/ (contending that the ex parte seizure provision “effectively
could let trade secret owners take competitors out of the marketplace for a period of time”).
165
S. 2267 § 2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c)).
166
See infra Appendix B (showing that forty-seven of fifty states have statute of limitations periods of less than five years).
167
S. 2267 § 2(e) (“Nothing in the amendments made by this section shall be construed . . . to preempt any other provision of law.”).
168
Id. §2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)).
162
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The DTSA has attracted considerable support from large industrial
and business organizations and high-technology firms, including the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
3M, Caterpillar, DuPont, GE, Eli Lilly, Microsoft, Monsanto, Philips,
Procter and Gamble, and United Technologies. 169 Many of these firms
also have engaged in lobbying efforts in support of federal trade secret
legislation under the moniker “Protect Trade Secrets Coalition,” retaining the prominent law firm of Covington & Burling LLP and expending
$500,000 for lobbying in 2014, according to the Center for Responsive
Politics. 170
At a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing in May 2014, witnesses
from the private and public sectors expressed support for the bill, arguing that existing federal criminal statutes and state laws were insufficient
to protect trade secrets. 171 One witness claimed that “a consistent, predictable and harmonized legal system” that “provide[s] effective remedies when a trade secret theft has occurred” was needed. 172 Several witnesses also argued that trade secret holders needed access to federal
courts to effectively combat trade secret theft. 173
169

News Release, Office of Sen. Christopher Coons, Senators Coons, Hatch Introduce Bill
to Combat Theft of Trade Secrets and Protect Jobs (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://
www.coons.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/release/senators-coons-hatch-introduce-bill-tocombat-theft-of-trade-secrets-and-protect-jobs.
170
See Defend Trade Secrets Act Introduced in Senate (Covington & Burling LLP) (Apr.
29, 2014), at 1, http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/e0460daa-3911-47c8-87647e40c9c4346d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ffb7dcde-bed1-499b-b7b5840823b1ba45/Defend_Trade_Secrets_Act_Introduced_in_Senate.pdf (“Covington and
Burling LLP represents the Protect Trade Secrets Coalition, a cross-industry group advocating a federal civil remedy for trade secret misappropriation.”); Center for Responsive Politics, Protect Trade Secrets Coalition, OpenSecrets.Org, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientsum.php?id=F45883&year=2014 (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (showing $500,000 in
lobbying expenses for the Protect Trade Secrets Coalition).
171
See Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Are Our Laws Adequate for Today’s
Threats?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 5 (2014) [hereinafter Hearing on Economic Espionage and Trade Secret
Theft] (testimony of Drew Greenblatt, President and Owner, Marlin Steel Wire Products)
(“State civil trade secret laws alone often are not sufficient to deter and remedy interstate
theft.”), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/economic-espionage-andtrade-secret-theft-are-our-laws-adequate-for-todays-threats; id. at 3 (statement of Douglas K.
Norman, Vice President and General Patent Counsel, Eli Lilly and Company) (“The current
legal tools available to prevent trade secret theft are antiquated and inconsistent with the robust protection available in other areas of intellectual property law.”).
172
Id. at 3 (testimony of Pamela Passman, President and CEO, CREATe.org).
173
See id. at 4 (statement of Douglas K. Norman); id. at 5–6 (testimony of Drew Greenblatt).
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The DTSA expired at the conclusion of the 113th Congress in January
2015. However, the bill’s sponsors have indicated their intent to reintroduce the legislation early in the 114th Congress. 174
2. Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014
The TSPA was introduced on July 29, 2014, by a bipartisan group of
members of the House Judiciary Committee. 175 This bill was introduced
following a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing on June 24, 2014,
where committee members expressed bipartisan support for a federal
civil remedy for trade secret misappropriation. 176
Like the DTSA, the TSPA would authorize a civil action for “misappropriation of a trade secret that is related to a product or service used
in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” 177 It also defines “misappropriation” as substantively identical to the UTSA’s definition. 178 Further, the TSPA would exempt “reverse engineering” and “independent derivation” from being considered “improper means.” 179 In
addition, it would authorize similar injunctive relief and damages to the
DTSA. 180 Finally, it would permit an award of exemplary damages and

174

See Anne L. Kim, Expect to See Trade Secret Legislation Re-Introduced Next Congress, Roll Call (Nov. 18, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/technocrat/expect-to-seetrade-secret-legislation-re-introduced-next-congress (“Sen. Chris Coons . . . said he hoped
and intended that he and current co-sponsor Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, R-Utah, would reintroduce
[trade secret legislation] in January and move it towards what he was ‘optimistic’ would be
its speedy passage.”).
175
See H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014). The bill’s sponsor is Representative George Holding (R-NC); the original co-sponsors are Representatives Steve Chabot (R-OH), Howard
Coble (R-NC), John Conyers (D-MI), Suzan DelBene (D-WA), Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY),
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), and Cedric Richmond (D-LA).
176
See Trade Secrets: Promoting and Protecting American Innovation, Competitiveness
and Market Access in Foreign Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6 (2014) (statement
of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Member, S. Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/5311b6c1-9a4f-49e5-a477-451a3ee228bf/
113-97-88436.pdf (“I believe that we have an opportunity to work quickly and in a broadly
bipartisan basis to ensure that our trade secrets law more robustly protects America’s innovators and businesses.”).
177
H.R. 5233 § 2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1)).
178
Compare id. § 2(b)(3) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)) (defining misappropriation), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(2) (defining misappropriation).
179
H.R. 5233 § 2(b)(3) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B)).
180
Compare id. § 2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)–(B)) (authorizing injunction for actual or threatened misappropriation and awarding damages for ac-
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reasonable attorney’s fees for “willfully and maliciously misappropriated” trade secrets. 181
The TSPA also contains an ex parte seizure provision, but it includes
additional protections against potential misuse. 182 For example, a plaintiff requesting a seizure must demonstrate that an “immediate and irreparable injury will occur if [a] seizure is not ordered” and that “the harm to
the applicant of denying the [seizure] outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests of the person against whom seizure would be ordered.” 183
It also requires that the plaintiff be likely to succeed in ultimately establishing that the party subject to the seizure order misappropriated and
possesses the trade secret, and that such party “would destroy, move,
hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court” if it had
notice of the proposed seizure. 184 It also requires that the court conduct a
hearing within seven days after the order’s entry and authorizes an
award of damages in the event of a wrongful or excessive seizure. 185
Similar to the DTSA, the TSPA would have a five-year statute of limitations. 186 It also would grant district courts original jurisdiction over
misappropriation claims and would not preempt any other law. 187
The TSPA was favorably reported out of the House Judiciary Committee on September 17, 2014, on a voice vote. 188 However, the bill expired at the conclusion of the 113th Congress in January 2015.

tual loss and unjust enrichment), with S. 2267, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)–(B)) (same).
181
H.R. 5233 § 2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(C)–(D)). In contrast to the DTSA, S. 2267 § 2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(C)),
which uses the disjunctive “or” (“willfully or maliciously misappropriated”) in its exemplary
damages provision, the TSPA, H.R. 5233 § 2(a), uses the conjunctive “and” (“willfully and
maliciously misappropriated”).
182
H.R. 5233 § 2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)).
183
Id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II)–(III)) (emphasis added).
184
Id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), (VI)).
185
Id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(iv), (b)(2)(F)).
186
Id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d)); S. 2267 § 2(a) (proposed for
codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c)).
187
H.R. 5233 § 2(a) (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c)); id. § 2(f).
188
See H.R. 5233—Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014: All Actions, Congress.gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5233/all-actions (last visited Dec.
1, 2014).
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3. Private Right of Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013
PRATSA was introduced in the House of Representatives in June
2013 by Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), 189 a member of the House
Judiciary Committee and an influential legislator on IP issues. In contrast to the other proposals, PRATSA proposes a more modest approach
to federalizing trade secrecy. Specifically, PRATSA would add two subsections to the “theft of trade secrets” provision of the EEA. The first
subsection would authorize “[a]ny person who suffers injury [from] a
violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1832 to] maintain a civil action against the violator.” 190 A successful plaintiff could recover “appropriate compensatory
damages” as well as “injunctive relief or other equitable relief.” 191
PRATSA also would impose a two-year statute of limitations, shorter
than the UTSA’s three-year limitations period. 192 The second subsection
would provide that independent derivation and reverse engineering are
not misappropriation under the EEA. 193
PRATSA was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which then
referred the bill to two subcommittees. 194 PRATSA expired at the end of
the 113th Congress in January 2015.
4. Future of American Innovation and Research Act of 2013
The FAIR Act was introduced in the Senate in November 2013 by
Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ). 195 Senator Flake explained that the FAIR Act
was intended to “fill a gap in current law and extend the jurisdiction of
U.S. federal courts to overseas perpetrators of trade-secret theft” by al-

189

H.R. 2466, 113th Cong. (2013).
Id. § 2 (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1832(c)).
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
See id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1832(d)) (“For purposes of [18 U.S.C.
§ 1832], the term ‘without authorization’ shall not mean independent derivation or working
backwards from a lawfully obtained known product or service to divine the process which
aided its development or manufacture.”).
194
See H.R. 2466—Private Right of Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013:
All Actions, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/2466/
all-actions (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (referring PRATSA to the House Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, and the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations).
195
S. 1770, 113th Cong. (2013). Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) was added as a cosponsor in
February 2014. See S. 1770—FAIR Act: Cosponsors, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1770/cosponsors (last visited Dec. 1, 2014).
190
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lowing “a person or company whose trade secret has been disclosed to
bring a civil suit . . . if the [perpetrating] entity is overseas.” 196
The FAIR Act is substantively identical to the UTSA regarding the
definitions of “trade secret” and “misappropriat[ion].” 197 In addition,
like the UTSA, the FAIR Act provides that “reverse engineering” and
“independent derivation” are not improper means of discovering a trade
secret. 198 Furthermore, its remedial provisions are similar to the
UTSA. 199 Finally, like the DTSA and the TSPA, the FAIR Act authorizes temporary ex parte seizures of property used to commit or facilitate
misappropriation. 200
One major difference compared to the other proposals is that the
FAIR Act is directed solely at trade secret misappropriation by foreign
entities and actors. It requires that the trade secret holder establish that
the defendant committed, threatened, or conspired to commit misappropriation while outside of the United States or acted “on behalf of, or for
the benefit of, a person located outside . . . the United States.” 201 As another limitation, the misappropriation also must cause, or be reasonably
anticipated to cause, injury within the United States or to a U.S. person. 202 Federal courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over claims under the FAIR Act 203 and could grant an anti-suit injunction prohibiting
the parties from pursuing litigation in another jurisdiction regarding the
same conduct. 204
196
Press Release, Office of Sen. Jeff Flake, Sen. Flake Introduces Bill to Help Protect U.S.
Innovations From Theft (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.flake.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
2013/11/sen-flake-introduces-bill-to-help-protect-u-s-innovations-from-theft.
197
Compare S. 1770 § 2(3), (5) (defining “misappropriate” and “trade secret”), with
UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(2), (4) (defining “misappropriation” and “trade secret” in substantively the same way).
198
Compare S. 1770 § 2(2)(B) (excluding “reverse engineering” and “independent derivation” from the definition of “improper means”), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 1 cmt. (noting
that “[d]iscovery by independent invention” and “[d]iscovery by ‘reverse engineering’” are
“[p]roper means”).
199
Compare S. 1770 § 4 (authorizing injunctions, payment of royalties for ongoing disclosures of covered trade secrets, and actual loss and unjust enrichment damages), with UTSA,
supra note 17, §§ 2–4 (same).
200
S. 1770 § 6(a). The FAIR Act also provides that a party injured by a seizure that prevails on the misappropriation claim may bring a civil action against the seizing party for reasonable costs and attorney’s fees and, if the order was sought in bad faith, lost profits and
punitive damages. Id. § 6(f).
201
Id. § 3(a).
202
Id. § 3(c).
203
Id. § 3(b).
204
Id. § 5(c).
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The FAIR Act was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee upon
its introduction. 205 Like the other proposed but un-enacted legislation,
the FAIR Act expired at the end of the 113th Congress in January 2015.
III. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO FEDERALIZE TRADE SECRECY
This Part evaluates whether Congress possesses the constitutional authority to enact a civil trade secret law.
The most likely source of authority for federalizing trade secrecy is
the Commerce Clause, which permits Congress to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.” 206 The Supreme Court has read this clause (in conjunction with
the Necessary and Proper Clause 207) to mean that Congress may regulate
three things: (1) “the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “persons or
things in interstate commerce,” and (3) “those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” 208 Congress’s Commerce Clause power
“can be expansive”; 209 for example, it encompasses even local (intrastate) activity when it “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce.” 210
However, this power is not unlimited, and the Supreme Court has
cautioned that the Commerce Clause “must be read carefully to avoid
creating a general federal authority akin to the [states’] police power.” 211
For instance, it has struck down federal legislation prohibiting posses205

159 Cong. Rec. S8457 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (introduction of S. 1770 by Sen. Jeff
Flake).
206
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
207
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (stating that Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof”).
208
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2000) (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)).
209
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
210
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
21–22 (2005) (rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act
as it was applied to respondents’ intrastate manufacture and possession of medical marijuana; the Court rejected the challenge because “Congress had a rational basis for believing that
failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana” would “substantially affect the larger interstate marijuana market”).
211
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (“[L]imitations on the
commerce power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause.”); Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (“[T]he power to regulate commerce, though broad indeed,
has limits.”).
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sion of a firearm in a school zone 212 and the creation of a federal civil
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence 213 because neither law
regulated economic activity. More recently, in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, a 5-4 majority of the Court held that
the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it would
“compel[] individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a
product”—insurance coverage from a private firm. 214
Congress has relied on its Commerce Clause power repeatedly to pass
legislation protecting intangible IP rights, most notably trademarks. After the Supreme Court struck down the first federal trademark law 215 in
The Trade-Mark Cases of 1879 as exceeding Congress’s authority under
the Patent and Copyright Clause, 216 Congress enacted a new trademark
law under the Commerce Clause. 217 This law contained an express jurisdictional limitation, granting the Commissioner of Patents the authority
to register only trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations or
Native American tribes. 218 As the scale of economic activity vastly expanded during the twentieth century, Congress subsequently expanded
the scope of federal trademark protection to encompass trademarks used
in interstate commerce, 219 unregistered marks, 220 marks with a bona fide
intent to be used in commerce, 221 and diluted famous marks. 222

212

Lopez, 513 U.S. at 551, 561 (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional).
213
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02, 610–11 (holding § 922(q) of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 unconstitutional).
214
132 S. Ct. at 2587 (emphasis omitted). However, the Court (in another 5-4 split) held
that the individual mandate was constitutional under Congress’s power to tax and spend. Id.
at 2593–601.
215
Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198, invalidated by The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879).
216
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93–97.
217
Act of March 3, 1881, 21 Stat. 502.
218
Id. § 3; see 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 5:3 (4th ed. 2009).
219
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 724.
220
Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 6, 60 Stat. 427, 429–30 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1056 (2012)).
221
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 103(9), 102 Stat. 3935,
3935–36 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2012)).
222
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985,
985–86 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012)).
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In the realm of trade secrecy, Congress enacted the EEA in 1996 223
under its Commerce Clause power. 224 As originally enacted, Section
1832 of the EEA contained an express jurisdictional hook limiting its
application to misappropriation of a trade secret “related to or included
in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign
commerce.” 225 But as the Second Circuit explained in United States v.
Aleynikov, this language did not invoke the full extent of Congress’s
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. 226 Notably, the EEA
was limited to products “produced for” or “placed in” interstate commerce, and thus did not encompass information—specifically, computer source code used to conduct high-frequency stock trading—that was
not used to create a tangible good and that the trade secret’s owner had
no intention of selling or licensing. 227 In response, Congress amended
Section 1832 to include “service[s] used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce” as well. 228 Even this amended language,
however, falls short of the constitutional limit because it does not extend to trade secret information related to products and services in intrastate commerce that, like the defendant in Wickard v. Filburn’s
growing of wheat for private consumption, on aggregate substantially
affect interstate commerce. 229
All recently proposed legislation to federalize trade secrecy appears
facially constitutional under the Commerce Clause. The DTSA and the
TSPA both contain an express jurisdictional limitation that would prohibit “misappropriation . . . related to a product or service used in, or
intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” 230 This language

223

See supra Subsection I.B.2.
See S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 4 (1996) (explaining that “[t]he basis for the protection of
proprietary economic information is rooted in . . . the power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce * * * among the several States’” (second alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 3)).
225
Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 101(a), 110 Stat. 3489 (1996) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1832 (2012)).
226
676 F.3d 71, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2012).
227
Id. at 82 (“Because the [high-frequency trading] system was not designed to enter or
pass in commerce, or to make something that does, [defendant’s] theft of source code relating to that system was not an offense under the EEA.”).
228
See supra note 101.
229
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 128–29 (1942).
230
See supra notes 156, 178 and accompanying text.
224
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is substantively identical to the jurisdictional scope of the EEA. 231
PRATSA, which would create a private cause of action for violations
of Section 1832 of the EEA, is similarly limited. 232 Finally, the FAIR
Act applies only to acts of trade secret theft occurring overseas or domestically at the behest of a foreign entity or government, thus assuming a substantial connection with foreign commerce. 233
However, there may be two situations in which a trade secret claim
is potentially vulnerable to a constitutional challenge alleging that
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power. The first would involve trade secret information owned by a purely intrastate business
with no substantial connection to interstate commerce. For instance,
the customer lists of a neighborhood restaurant or local cleaning service are unlikely to be of interest to anyone other than a nearby competitor and thus probably do not substantially affect interstate commerce even if misappropriated. The second would involve a type of
“inactivity” that may run afoul of the Court’s recent decision in Sebelius—specifically, misappropriation of so-called “negative knowhow,” or information about what avenues of research and development
have proven unfruitful. 234 This information could be valuable to competitors because it suggests what types of research should be avoided
in future. 235 Thus, information about what not to do could be considered “inaction [in] commerce” 236 that cannot be regulated under the
Commerce Clause.
In sum, Congress almost certainly has the authority to enact a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. 237 The next
Part addresses whether such a law is normatively desirable.
231

See supra note 102 and accompanying text (stating that trade secret theft under section
1832 of the EEA must involve a trade secret “related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce”); supra note 191 (explaining that PRATSA
would create a private civil cause of action for violations of section 1832 of the EEA).
232
See supra notes 190–92, 228 and accompanying text.
233
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
234
See infra note 460 and accompanying text; see also Charles Tait Graves, The Law of
Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 387, 391–94 (2007) (explaining
the issue of negative knowledge in general and in the trade secret context).
235
See Graves, supra note 234, at 391 (“Broadly speaking, negative knowledge is information about perceived mistakes and shortcomings that one avoids in order to create something new, or that one modifies into something different and improved.”).
236
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
237
See Almeling, supra note 8, at 792–93 (“[T]rade secrets have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and would thus easily qualify under the Commerce Clause.” (footnote
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IV. EVALUATING THE ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERALIZING TRADE SECRECY
This Part critically evaluates the arguments in favor of a private civil
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation under federal law.
Specifically, it addresses proponents’ claims that federal legislation is
required to achieve four objectives: (1) to achieve uniformity in trade
secret law; (2) to create a federal forum for important trade secret litigation; (3) to comply with the United States’s obligations under international law; and (4) to promote innovation by creating a national IP
regime.
A. Uniformity
One argument advanced in support of a federal trade secret law is
that it would create substantive uniformity. 238 Numerous commentators
have bemoaned an alleged lack of consistency among states’ trade secret laws. 239 In particular, they assert that significant variations exist
between the two main sources of authority governing trade secrecy at
the state level: the Restatement and the UTSA. 240 This lack of uniformity has a number of negative consequences, they argue, including
uncertainty regarding which state’s laws will govern a trade secret
claim; 241 increased and inefficient costs associated with investigating
and complying with different states’ requirements for achieving trade
secret protection; 242 and ultimately less investment in innovation. 243

omitted)); Lao, supra note 53, at 1686 (“[T]he Commerce Clause, which allows Congress to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce, is probably the strongest constitutional basis for
federal action.” (footnote omitted)).
238
See Almeling, supra note 8, at 776 (asserting that “the most obvious benefit of [a Federal Trade Secrets Act] is that it will instantly accomplish . . . uniformity”); Pace, supra note
51, at 442 (“The best reason for enacting federal legislation to displace state law on trade
secret misappropriation is the need for national uniformity in this area of law.”).
239
See Almeling, supra note 8, at 776 (“The dominant failure of a state-based trade secret
regime is that trade secret law differs from state to state.”); Lao, supra note 53, at 1635–36;
Pace, supra note 51, at 446; Mark A. Klapow, The Latest Attempt to Federalize Trade Secret
Law, Law360, Crowell & Moring (Aug. 1, 2012, 1:57 PM), http://www.crowell.com/files/
The-Latest-Attempt-To-Federalize-Trade-Secret-Law.pdf (“Lack of uniformity . . . is the
primary criticism of the current [trade secret] regime.”).
240
See Lao, supra note 53, at 1653–56 (listing differences between the Restatement and
the UTSA); Pace, supra note 51, at 432–35 (noting many of the same differences between
the Restatement and the UTSA).
241
Almeling, supra note 8, at 777; Lao, supra note 53, at 1636.
242
Almeling, supra note 8, at 776–78; Lao, supra note 53, at 1673–74; Pace, supra note 51,
at 447.
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They also contend that the lack of uniformity creates significant
choice-of-law problems in trade secret litigation. 244 However, as described below, this justification ultimately is not persuasive because
there is already a high degree of uniformity in state laws governing
trade secrets and the adoption of a federal act would not necessarily
solve the identified problems.
1. Widespread Adoption of the UTSA Has Promoted Uniformity
As an initial matter, the UTSA’s widespread adoption has helped
harmonize the substantive law governing trade secrecy. The UTSA effectively serves as a de facto national standard, having been adopted
by forty-seven states. 245 Texas, a longtime common law jurisdiction,
was the most recent state to enact the UTSA, doing so in May 2013. 246
The remaining holdouts are Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina. 247 There is pending legislation in Massachusetts 248 to enact the
UTSA and supersede its existing hybrid statutory and common law regime. 249 Thus, the remaining “holdout” jurisdictions may eventually
follow the national trend and adopt the UTSA as well.
243

Almeling, supra note 8, at 778.
Id. at 781–82; Lao, supra note 53, at 1671–72; Pace, supra note 51, at 446.
245
See infra Appendix A; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
246
Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, S.B. 953 (enacted May 3, 2013) (codified at Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 134A.001–.008 (West 2013)).
247
See infra Appendix A. There is some dispute regarding whether North Carolina should
be considered a UTSA jurisdiction. Compare Lao, supra note 53, at 1657 (asserting North
Carolina’s statute “deviate[s] so radically from the UTSA that [it is] hardly recognizable as
[an] adoption[] of the uniform act”), and Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The States’ Response, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 49, 52 (1990) (contending that the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152 to -157
(1985), contains “major departures from the [UTSA]”), with David P. Hathaway, Comment,
Is the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act Itself a Secret, and Is the Act Worth Protecting?, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 2149, 2165–66 (1999) (“Despite some minor variations, the [North
Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act] is not fundamentally different from the UTSA and
other states’ trade secret acts.” (footnote omitted)). Because the Uniform Law Commission
does not include North Carolina in its list of states that have adopted the UTSA, it has been
excluded from this Article’s tally of UTSA jurisdictions. See supra note 68.
248
H.B. 4082, 188th Gen. Court (Mass. 2014); H.B. 27, 188th Gen. Court. (Mass. 2013).
249
See Massachusetts Trade Secret Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42–42A
(2012); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 1354 (Mass. 1979) (discussing
Massachusetts trade secret common law); see also Sutra, Inc. v. Iceland Exp., No. 04-11360DPW, 2008 WL 2705580, *2 (D. Mass. July 10, 2008) (explaining that “[e]xcept for the
provision of double damages and injunctive relief, the [Massachusetts Trade Secret Protection Act] essentially represent[s] a codification of the common law of trade secrets”).
244
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Judicial opinions in trade secret cases provide additional evidence
that the UTSA’s adoption has helped harmonize trade secret law. In an
empirical study of trade secret litigation in state courts, attorney David
Almeling and his co-authors found that over two-thirds (68%) of state
court decisions on trade secret claims from 1995–2009 applied state
trade secret statutes, primarily the UTSA, rather than common law or
criminal law. 250 A similar study by the same authors found that 70% of
federal courts decisions in 2008 applied state statutory law, again primarily the UTSA, to decide trade secret claims. 251 In contrast, few
courts applied state common law—less than a quarter (24%) of state
courts and only 7% of federal courts during the same respective time
periods. 252
Furthermore, critics of the existing state law system argue that the
UTSA is not truly “uniform” because a number of states have modified
the UTSA’s provisions when adopting it as statutory law. 253 However,
most jurisdictions follow the UTSA’s substance on the main points 254
and depart only on less frequently encountered issues, such as the
availability and amount of exemplary (punitive) damages. 255 For instance, one claimed divergence among UTSA jurisdictions is the stat-

250
David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State
Courts, 46 Gonz. L. Rev. 57, 76 tbl.5 (2010–11).
251
David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal
Courts, 45 Gonz. L. Rev. 291, 306 tbl.4 (2009–10); see also Michael Risch, An Empirical
Look at Trade Secret Law’s Shift from Common to Statutory Law, in Intellectual Property
and the Common Law 151, 173–74 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (finding that courts
“rely on UTSA principles much of the time,” citing to “the statute alone, and . . . to the statute and UTSA-based cases,” but also sometimes citing “to the statute and non-UTSA cases
without any citation to UTSA cases” or to “only common law cases with no mention of the
UTSA at all”).
252
Almeling et al., supra note 250; Almeling et al., supra note 251, at 311 tbl.8.
253
See, e.g., Almeling, supra note 8, at 773 (“[E]ven among the . . . states that have enacted [the UTSA], differences remain because legislatures in those states have modified the
UTSA . . . .”); Lao, supra note 53, at 1661 (“Even among states that have adopted the UTSA,
variations exist to the extent that each state’s statutory scheme modifies the uniform law.”).
254
See Samuels & Johnson, supra note 247, at 94 (“Though there are significant variations . . . most states, thus far, have followed the thrust of the Uniform Trade Secret[s]
Act.”); see also Steve Borgman, The Adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act: How Uniform is Uniform?, 27 IDEA 73, 118 (1986) (concluding that “the substance of the [UTSA]
remains uniform throughout the [first twelve] adopting states” (emphasis omitted)).
255
Lao, supra note 53, at 1664; Samuels & Johnson, supra note 247, at 81–83.
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ute of limitations period to bring misappropriation claims. 256 But in
fact, the vast majority of UTSA jurisdictions (thirty-nine out of fortyseven) have adopted the three-year statute of limitations suggested in
the UTSA. 257 Moreover, the two states with the largest number of trade
secret cases—California and Texas—currently have a three-year statute of limitations, suggesting that forum shopping for longer time periods is not a major problem. 258
In sum, while the UTSA has not brought about complete harmonization, even advocates of federalization concede that its adoption has
“provided greater consistency in the application of trade secret law and
in the laws themselves” 259 and helped create a “coherent and consistent
body of trade secrets law.” 260
2. The Restatement and the UTSA Are Highly Similar
Furthermore, in states like New York that continue to adhere to the
original Restatement, the law governing trade secrecy is generally consistent with the UTSA. 261 For example, both the Restatement and the
UTSA permit a broad amount of business-related information—
including products and processes that are patent-eligible 262—to be potentially protectable as a trade secret. 263 And both agree on the core requirements for establishing a trade secret: (1) the protected information

256

See Lao, supra note 53, at 1665; David S. Almeling, A Practical Case for Federalizing
Trade Secret Law, Law360 (June 16, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
106724/a-practical-case-for-federalizing-trade-secret-law.
257
See infra Appendix B (listing the statute of limitations for trade secret misappropriation
claims in each state). The remaining states have limitations periods ranging from two to five
years. See infra Appendix B.
258
See infra Appendix B; Almeling et al., supra note 250, at 74 tbl.4.
259
David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1091, 1106 (2012).
260
Halligan, supra note 88, at 670.
261
See UTSA, supra note 17, at prefatory note (explaining that the UTSA was intended to
“codif[y]the basic principles of common law trade secret protection”).
262
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939) (“A trade secret may be a device or process which is patentable; but it need not be that.”), with UTSA, supra note 17, at
prefatory note (noting that trade secret protection of “patentable or unpatentable information” is
not preempted by the Patent Clause of the Constitution).
263
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939) (“A trade secret may consist of
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information . . . .”), with UTSA, supra note 17,
§ 1(4) (“‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process . . . .”).
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has value because it is not generally known or used by competitors, 264
and (2) the holder must take steps to keep it secret from others. 265
The concept of “improper means” is central to determining misappropriation under both regimes. 266 The Restatement and the UTSA both
prohibit a party from acquiring another’s trade secret through “improper
means” and then disclosing or using it. 267 And both impose liability on
third parties who use or disclose another’s trade secret if they know or
have reason to know it was originally obtained through improper
means. 268
There is also agreement about a broad range of conduct that constitutes “improper means” under both the Restatement and the UTSA.
Criminal conduct, such as theft, bribery, and fraud, certainly qualifies as
improper means, 269 as does eavesdropping, electronic espionage, and
264

Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939) (stating that a trade secret
“gives [the owner] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or
use it”), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(4)(i) (stating that a trade secret “derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to . . . other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use”).
265
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939) (“[A] substantial element of
secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in
acquiring the information.”), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(4)(ii) (stating that a trade secret “is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy”).
266
See William E. Hilton, What Sort of Improper Conduct Constitutes Misappropriation of
a Trade Secret, 30 IDEA 287, 289 (1990) (“It is well-settled that conduct which results in
obtaining trade secret information by improper means constitutes misappropriation.” (footnote omitted)); see also Klitzke, supra note 40, at 293 (“The term ‘improper means’ is a
basic building block upon which the framework of the [UTSA] depends.”).
267
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 (1939) (“One who discloses or uses another’s trade secret . . . is liable . . . if . . . he discovered the secret by improper means . . . .”),
with UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(2) (“‘Misappropriation’ means . . . disclosure or use of a
trade secret of another . . . by a person who . . . used improper means to acquire knowledge
of the trade secret . . . .”).
268
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 (1939) (“One who discloses or uses another’s trade secret . . . is liable . . . if . . . he learned the secret from a third person . . . and
[knew] that the third person discovered [the trade secret] by improper means . . . .”), with
UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(2) (“‘Misappropriation’ means . . . disclosure or use of a trade secret . . . by a person who . . . at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know
that his knowledge of the trade secret was . . . derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it . . . .”). There is, however, a conflict between the Restatement and the UTSA regarding whether a third party is liable, under certain circumstances, if it innocently acquires trade secret information from another party and subsequently
uses or discloses it after receiving notice of its status. Lao, supra note 53, at 1660 & n.160.
269
See UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(1) (stating that improper means includes “theft” and
“bribery”); Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. f (1939) (stating that improper means includes “physical force” and “break[ing] into another’s office”); see also Hilton, supra note
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computer hacking. 270 Acquiring a trade secret through fraudulent misrepresentation also constitutes improper means, 271 as does breaching or
inducing a breach of a confidential relationship or a contractual duty. 272
Finally, the Restatement and the UTSA also agree on two key types of
conduct that do not qualify as improper means: reverse engineering and
independent invention. 273
The remedial provisions of the Restatement are also highly similar to
those of the UTSA, although not identical. Both authorize injunctive relief to prevent continuing or future harm from misappropriation. 274 In
addition, both systems allow the trade secret owner to recover damages
for the actual loss caused by the misappropriation, 275 as well as for the

266, at 294 (“A person who acquires another’s trade secret by theft, fraud, breaking and entering a building, committing a trespass, bribing, swindling, or committing any illegal activity in obtaining another’s trade secret, will be found to have procured the trade secret through
improper means.” (footnotes omitted)).
270
See UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(1) (stating that improper means includes “espionage
through electronic or other means”); Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. f (1939) (stating
that improper means includes “tapping of telephone wires, eavesdropping or other espionage”); see also Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys. Inc., No. CA 03-1193-A, 2003 WL
23018270, at *8 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2003) (“There can be no doubt that the use of a computer
software robot to hack into a computer system and to take or copy proprietary information is
an improper means to obtain a trade secret . . . .”).
271
See UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(1) (stating that improper means includes “misrepresentation”); Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. f (1939) (stating that improper means includes
“fraudulent misrepresentations to induce disclosure”).
272
See UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(1) (stating that improper means includes “breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy”); Restatement (First) of Torts § 757
cmt. j (1939) (stating that improper means includes “breach of the confidence . . . in disclosing the secret”); see also Hilton, supra note 266, at 294–95 (“[I]f the alleged misappropriator
breaches a contract in . . . obtaining the trade secret, then the alleged misappropriator’s conduct will be deemed improper resulting in a finding of misappropriation.”).
273
See UTSA, supra note 17, § 1 cmt. (“Proper means include . . . [d]iscovery by independent invention [and] [d]iscovery by ‘reverse engineering . . . .’”); Restatement (First) of
Torts § 757 cmt. a (1939) (“One who discovers another’s trade secret properly, as, for example, by inspection or analysis of the commercial product embodying the secret, or by independent invention . . . is free to disclose it or use it in his own business without liability to
the owner.”).
274
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. e (1939) (stating that a trade secret
owner may be “granted an injunction against future harm by disclosure or adverse use”),
with UTSA, supra note 17, § 2(a) (“Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.”).
275
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. e (1939) (stating that a trade secret owner “may recover damages for past harm”), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 3(a) (stating that a trade
secret owner “is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation . . . includ[ing] . . . the actual
loss caused by misappropriation”).

COPYRIGHT © 2015, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

358

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 101:317

value of the misappropriator’s unjust enrichment. 276 Punitive damages
can be awarded for egregious violations, 277 although the UTSA caps punitive damages at twice compensatory damages, while the Restatement
contains no such ceiling. 278
Another oft-cited difference between the Restatement and the
UTSA—whether a trade secret must be continuously used in the owner’s
business 279—appears to have had a modest impact, at best, in trade secret litigation. The official Restatement comments provide that a trade
secret is “information which is used in one’s business, and which gives
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it.” 280 This differs from the UTSA, which does not require
the owner to actually use a trade secret. 281 But as IP attorney Melvin Jager’s treatise explains, this difference is more illusory than real because
“[m]ost decisions in the jurisdictions following the common law have
overlooked or specifically rejected the Restatement comment requiring
‘continuous use’ by the owner.” 282 For example, the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois common law before that state’s adoption of the UTSA,
held that “[a]ctual use is unnecessary” for a trade secret. 283 Similarly, the
Texas Supreme Court, applying Texas common law, found a trade secret
existed even if the product containing the trade secret was never mass

276
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. e (1939) (stating that the trade secret
owner may “be granted an accounting of the wrongdoer’s profits”), with UTSA, supra note
17, § 3(a) (stating that the trade secret owner “is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation . . . includ[ing] . . . the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss”).
277
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 908(1) (1939) (authorizing punitive damages to
“punish [the tortfeasor] for his outrageous conduct”), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 3(b) (authorizing exemplary damages for “willful and malicious misappropriation”).
278
Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 908(2) (1939) (“Where punitive damages are
permissible, their allowance and amount are within the discretion of the trier of fact.”), with
UTSA, supra note 17, § 3(b) (authorizing exemplary damages “in an amount not exceeding
twice any award” of compensatory damages).
279
See Lao, supra note 53, at 1654 & n.120, 1658–59; Almeling, supra note 256.
280
Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b (1939).
281
See UTSA, supra note 17, § 1 cmt. (“The definition of ‘trade secret’ contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition which required that a trade
secret be ‘continuously used in one’s business.’ The broader definition in the [UTSA] extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired the means to
put a trade secret to use.”).
282
1 Jager, supra note 31, § 5:7, at 5–29.
283
Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1983).
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manufactured or sold commercially, thus implicitly rejecting a “continuous use” requirement. 284
The remaining differences between the Restatement and UTSA, such
as liability for mere acquisition of a trade secret, 285 appear relatively minor in comparison to state-by-state variations in other areas of law. 286
Ultimately, as the Federal Circuit has recognized, “trade secret law varies little from state to state.” 287
3. Federalization Will Not Necessarily Create Uniformity
Even if federal trade secret legislation were enacted, it would not necessarily result in substantive uniformity, for the reasons described below.
a. Lack of Federal Preemption
One important issue is whether federal trade secret legislation would
preempt state trade secret law. Under the Supremacy Clause, 288 any state
law that conflicts with federal law is preempted and thus is “without effect.” 289 The Supreme Court recognizes two types of preemption: express and implied. 290 Express preemption occurs when a federal statute

284

Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776–77 (Tex. 1958); see also Sikes v.
McGraw-Edison Co., 671 F.2d 150, 151 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing the Huffines case). A
recent Fifth Circuit decision applying Texas law, CQ, Inc. v. TXU Mining Co., 565 F.3d 268,
274–75 (5th Cir. 2009), which has been cited in support of a “continuous use” requirement,
see Almeling, supra note 256, is no longer good law, having been superseded by Texas’s
adoption of the UTSA. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
285
See Lao, supra note 53, at 1654, 1659–60. Compare Restatement (First) of Torts § 757
(1939) (“One who discloses or uses another’s trade secret . . . is liable to the other . . . .”
(emphases added)), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(2)(i)–(ii) (“‘Misappropriation’
means . . . acquisition of a trade secret . . . by improper means; or . . . disclosure or use of a
trade secret of another . . . .” (emphases added)).
286
For example, not all states have recognized the widely-adopted theory of strict liability
for defective products. See Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609–10 (Va. 1992) (rejecting
strict liability in a products liability action); Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 268 S.E.2d 504,
509–10 (N.C. 1980) (same).
287
TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
288
See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
289
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819)).
290
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
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expressly declares Congress’s intent to preempt state law. 291 Implied
preemption, in contrast, exists when Congress’s intent to preempt state
legislation is not explicit but “implicitly contained in [the federal law’s]
structure and purpose.” 292
Currently, none of the proposed legislation would preempt state trade
secret law, expressly or implicitly, thus permitting a federal civil cause
of action to coexist with state law. Both the DTSA and the TSPA expressly disclaim any intent to “preempt any other provision of law.” 293
PRATSA, which would create a private cause of action under Section
1832 of the EEA, itself is silent regarding preemption. 294 However, the
EEA expressly disclaims any intent to preempt state law governing trade
secrecy. 295 Finally, the FAIR Act, which is silent regarding preemption,
likely would not preempt state law because of its limited focus on extraterritorial misappropriation, 296 leaving domestic trade secret claims untouched.
Federal legislation that does not preempt state law ultimately will undermine harmonization, rather than promote it, by creating a federal regime that exists in parallel with state trade secret law. 297 In particular, if
a private cause of action is authorized for EEA violations—as proposed

291

See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (explaining that express
preemption exists “[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a ‘reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority’”
(quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978))).
292
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
293
S. 2267, 113th Cong. § 2(e) (2014); H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. § 2(f) (2014).
294
H.R. 2466, 113th Cong. (2013).
295
See 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2012) (“This chapter shall not be construed to preempt or displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by . . . State, commonwealth,
possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a trade secret . . . .”). Clear statutory
language disclaiming federal preemption generally will be given effect. See, e.g., Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 517 (“When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there
is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legislation.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
296
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
297
A parallel can be drawn to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were adopted
with the goal of promoting uniformity by encouraging states to adopt them as the model for
their own courts’ procedures. Ultimately, however, “only a minority of states have embraced
the system and philosophy of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure].” John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil
Procedure, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1367, 1369 (1986).
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by both the DTSA and PRATSA—the differences between the EEA and
state trade secret law would actually make trade secret law less uniform
in several key ways. First, the EEA’s definition of a trade secret differs
significantly from the UTSA. 298 The EEA contains a more extensive list
of information that is potentially protectable as a trade secret compared
to the UTSA, suggesting that the EEA’s definition may be interpreted
more broadly. 299 Second, the EEA and UTSA diverge regarding the relevant audience for the requirement that a trade secret derive value “from
not being generally known” and “not being readily ascertainable through
proper means.” 300 The UTSA’s audience is “other persons who can obtain economic value from [the trade secret’s] disclosure or use” 301—in
other words, the “relevant competitors in the field.” 302 In contrast, the
EEA provides that “the public” is the relevant audience. 303 Because
“[t]he general public usually will not know, nor be able to readily ascer298
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012) (defining a trade secret as “all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods,
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes”), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(4)
(defining a trade secret as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process”).
299
United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Trade secrets are no longer
restricted to formulas, patterns, and compilations, but now include programs and codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well Should We Be Allowed to Hide
Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1,
10 (1998) (explaining the EEA’s longer list of items potentially protectable as trade secrets
“should lead courts to interpret the provision broadly—to include such ‘information’ as marketing strategy and customer lists, which have sometimes raised questions in state cases”).
But see Pooley, Lemley & Toren, supra note 82, at 189 (“Because of the expansive interpretation already given to the UTSA definition, the EEA will probably apply to the same types
of information which qualify as trade secrets under the current civil standard.” (footnote
omitted)).
300
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (requiring that a trade secret “derive[] independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public”), with UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(4)(i)
(requiring that a trade secret “derive[] independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use”).
301
UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(4)(i).
302
Robin J. Effron, Note, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial Application of the Economic
Espionage Act and the TRIPS Agreement, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1475, 1488 (2003); see UTSA,
supra note 17, § 1 cmt. (explaining that a trade secret does not exist if it is “unknown to the
general public but readily known within the [relevant] industry”).
303
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); see also Effron, supra note 302, at 1488 (“Under the EEA, information is secret if it is not known by the ‘public.’”).
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tain, information about a manufacturing process or business procedure,”
the EEA definition is potentially broader regarding what can be held as a
trade secret. 304
Other differences between the EEA and the UTSA also undermine
uniformity. Section 1832 of the EEA contains several mens rea requirements that are absent from the UTSA (and the Restatement as well),
most notably that the defendant intends to convert the trade secret to
economically benefit himself or another, intending or knowing that his
conduct would “injure” the trade secret owner. 305 Furthermore, the EEA
does not expressly permit reverse engineering, 306 while the UTSA
does. 307 Finally, the EEA—which relies on the general federal criminal
statute of limitations 308—presently has a five-year limitations period, 309
which is longer than the majority of states. 310
b. Conflicting Statutory Interpretations
An additional source of potential divergence is conflicting statutory
interpretations regarding a federal trade secret act. 311 Conflicts in statutory interpretations are inherent in numerous areas governed by federal
law. 312 These differences can only be resolved in the final instance by
the Supreme Court—a time-consuming process, if it can be accom304
Moohr, supra note 58, at 878. There is currently a circuit split regarding the interpretation of “the public” as used in the EEA. Compare United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 267
(7th Cir. 2002) (interpreting “the public” in the EEA as not necessarily meaning the “general
public,” but “the economically relevant public”), with United States. v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189,
196 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that “the EEA alters the relevant party from whom proprietary
information must be kept confidential”).
305
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
306
See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575, 1577–78 (2002) (noting the EEA’s “lack of a reverse engineering defense”).
307
See supra note 58 and accompanying text. As previously mentioned, however,
PRATSA would expressly authorize reverse engineering under § 1831, thus removing this
inconsistency. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
308
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012).
309
See United States v. Case, 309 F. App’x 883, 884–86 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting the fiveyear limitations period under EEA).
310
See supra text accompanying note 64; see also infra Appendix B.
311
See Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
383, 407 (1991) (“[E]ven under a regime of exclusive federal jurisdiction, there will be frequent conflicts in the interpretation of federal law between the twelve circuit courts of appeals.”).
312
For examples of current circuit splits in federal statutory interpretation, see Seton Hall
Circuit Review, available at http://scholarship.shu.edu/circuit_review.
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plished at all 313—or through legislative action by Congress. 314 For one
illustration related to trade secrecy, there is currently an unresolved circuit split regarding whether a so-called “faithless employee” is liable
under the CFAA for misusing proprietary business information that he
or she is otherwise lawfully permitted to access. 315 Thus, even “under a
federal trade secret statute, trade secret owners would likely be faced
with geographic differences in the case law interpreting that statute.” 316
c. Fact-Specific Decision Making
Furthermore, uniformity is likely unachievable even under a federal
regime due to the highly factual and contextual nature of many key issues in trade secret litigation. For instance, whether a trade secret is
“generally known” or “readily ascertainable through proper means” is
inherently fact-dependent. 317 In addition, what facts satisfy these requirements may change over time due to technological developments,
such as the ability to locate once-obscure information due to the Internet
and sophisticated search engines 318 and the increasing use of sophisticat313
See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1572 (2008) (contending that “standardizing federal law is no longer possible as a practical matter” due to the
Supreme Court’s relatively small docket and exponential growth in the number of federal
statutes).
314
See Stefanie A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit Court Decisions, 85 Judicature 61, 66–67 (2001) (“Congress adopts some role in ensuring that its statutes are applied uniformly throughout the country, although [it] is not nearly
as active as the Supreme Court in this area.” (footnote omitted)).
315
Compare EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581–84 (1st Cir.
2001) (holding that the terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” in the
CFAA are broad enough to cover an employee who misuses an employer’s information that
he or she is permitted to access), and United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260, 1263
(11th Cir. 2010) (same), and United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010)
(same), and Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006)
(same), with WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, L.L.C. v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204, 206 (4th
Cir. 2012) (holding that the CFAA does not reach mere misuse of employer information to
which the employee had authorized access or violations of company use policies), and United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (same).
316
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Trade Secrets Committee 3 (2007) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review).
317
See MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 417 (E.D. Va.
2004) (“What constitutes readily ascertainable through proper means is heavily factdependent and simply boils down to assessing the ease with which a trade secret could have
been independently discovered.”).
318
See United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“[W]hat is ‘generally known’ and ‘reasonably ascertainable’ about ideas, concepts, and technology is constantly
evolving in the modern age.”); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the
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ed encryption methods to protect valuable information stored electronically. 319
d. Embedded State Law Issues
Finally, federalization would not resolve the choice-of-law problems
identified by its proponents 320 because the resolution of trade secret
claims often depends upon other areas of state law, including contract,
employment, and tort. For example, “many [state] trade secret claims
and allegations are closely intertwined with contracts, such as employment contracts and joint-venture agreements,” 321 that are governed by
state law. Similarly, breach of a fiduciary duty imposed by state law can
give rise to a misappropriation claim. 322 In addition, state law governs
the scope and enforceability of restrictive covenants like non-disclosure
agreements and non-compete clauses that are commonly used to protect
trade secret information. 323 As a result, even if trade secret protection
were federalized, a federal court frequently would have to engage in a
choice-of-law analysis regarding such “embedded” state law issues. 324

Internet Through Sequential Preservation, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 20 (2007) (“The very
nature of the Internet—that it allows equal access to anyone with a computer, irrespective of
certain traditional limitations to accessing information, like geography and cost—means that
it makes information at least readily discoverable, if not ascertainable.” (footnote omitted)).
319
See Hecny Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting the absence
of encryption for customer information as supporting the district court’s conclusion that a
trade secret did not exist); see also Victoria A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect
Trade Secrets in a Digital Environment, 49 IDEA 359, 410 (2009) (concluding that trade secret holders should use digital tools to protect trade secrets).
320
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
321
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, supra note 316, at 3; see also Alan J. Tracey, The
Contract in the Trade Secret Ballroom—A Forgotten Dance Partner?, 16 Tex. Intell. Prop.
L.J. 47, 79 (2007) (“The fact patterns that lead a plaintiff to claim both breach of contract
and misappropriation of trade secrets are legion, as the contract that can be used to meet the
requirement of the trade secret owner using ‘reasonable efforts’ to protect its trade secrets
can also provide the basis of a breach of contract claim.”).
322
See John T. Cross, UTSA Displacement of Other State Law Claims, 33 Hamline L.
Rev. 445, 449–50 (2010).
323
See Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 167, 188–91 (2005).
324
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, supra note 316, at 3; see also Almeling, supra note 8,
at 782 (“To be sure, there would continue to be choice-of-law issues that accompany trade
secret litigation, such as if the complaint asserts theories under state employment or contract
law.”).
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4. The Potential Benefits of Trade Secret Federalism
Finally, advocates of federalizing trade secrecy tend to overlook the
potential benefits of a decentralized, state law approach that permits
some limited variations in trade secret law. 325 Uniformity is “thought to
be virtuous in almost every area of the law [because] it insures that like
cases, and litigants, are treated alike.” 326 Thus, uniformity is considered
beneficial as “a means of ensuring the predictability of legal obligations.” 327
However, there also are advantages to permitting at least some statebased variation and experimentation. One oft-cited benefit is that it
“makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.” 328 Under this theory, “states will compete
with each other for citizens and businesses through the enactment and
enforcement of laws that produce a favorable environment.” 329 Thus,
as Justice Brandeis explained in his famous dissent in New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, federalism permits states to “serve as a laboratory[]
and try novel social and economic experiments.” 330 Experimentation
can produce alternatives to address the same issue or problem, “from
which the best solution may ultimately emerge.” 331
Under a state-law-based system of trade secrecy, states can determine what amount of legal protection is most likely to foster innovation and promote economic growth. 332 As an example from a related
state law doctrine, legal and economic scholars have attempted to analyze the impact of differing rules governing the enforceability of post325

See Almeling, supra note 8, at 793 (calling “unpersuasive” the argument that “there are
benefits to a state-based trade secret law that would be lost upon federalization”). But see
Lao, supra note 53, at 1692–94 (analyzing arguments for federalism and concluding that the
only significant one is the theory that states can serve as “laboratories” of experimentation).
326
Solimine, supra note 311, at 406.
327
Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 38 (1994); see also id. at 38–39 (“[W]hile the uniform interpretation and application of legal rules in every legal dispute are not logical prerequisites for the predictability of such rules, in our system of multiple potential venues for
dispute resolution, uniformity becomes a practical prerequisite to predictability.” (footnote
omitted)).
328
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
329
Lao, supra note 53, at 1692.
330
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
331
Lao, supra note 53, at 1694.
332
For an analogous argument on promoting policy innovation through experimentation in
patent law, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 Va. L. Rev. 65, 84-87
(2015).
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employment restrictions, like non-competition agreements, on local
economic development and skilled worker mobility. 333 To a limited extent, the same process of state-law-based experimentation can occur in
trade secrecy.
For instance, one area where states’ trade secret laws have diverged
is the so-called “inevitable disclosure” doctrine. Under this rule, “a
plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to
rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.” 334 Inevitable disclosure is not a
separate cause of action; rather, it is a means of proving misappropriation or irreparable harm for injunctive relief. Some UTSA jurisdictions
(like Illinois) have recognized the inevitable disclosure doctrine, while
others (like California) have rejected it. 335
There are competing policy considerations on both sides of the debate regarding inevitable disclosure. On one hand, the doctrine is useful for protecting an employer’s highly sensitive trade secret information, such as manufacturing processes, marketing strategies, and
customer information, from being improperly used against it if a highranking employee joins a competing firm. 336 At the same time, however, it can prevent employees from obtaining comparable employment
in the same industry and reduce the mobility of a highly skilled work-

333
See generally Orly Lobel, Intellectual Property and Restrictive Covenants, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: Labor and Employment Law and Economics 517 (Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (providing an overview of restrictive labor covenants);
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575 (1999) (analyzing the effects of legal rules governing employee mobility on high technology industrial districts); Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J.
Legal Stud. 93 (1981) (arguing that non-compete agreements are necessary for efficient investment in human capital).
334
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
335
Compare Liebert Corp. v. Mazur, 827 N.E.2d 909, 927 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“Under
Illinois law, courts may also grant injunctive relief to prevent the inevitable use or disclosure
of misappropriated trade secrets.” (citations omitted)), with Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125
Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 291–94 (Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting “inevitable disclosure” under California
law). See also Ryan M. Wiesner, Comment, A State-By-State Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure: A Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 16 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 211,
217–28 (2012) (summarizing every state’s application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
336
See Rowe, supra note 323, at 183–84 (noting an employer’s “strong interest in protecting its valuable trade secrets”).
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force. 337 Ultimately, this may hinder economic growth and innovation. 338
If trade secrecy were federalized, state courts and legislatures would
not be able to experiment by deciding whether to recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine. As a result, firms that engage in innovation
protected by trade secrecy would no longer be free to choose whether
to conduct their research in states that follow (or do not follow) the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 339 A uniform federal trade secret law
would short-circuit attempts to assess the doctrine’s impact on innovation. 340
Of course, there is an inherent tension between promoting uniformity and permitting local variation. However, the two are not irreconcilable. Consider the role of local rules in a uniform system of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 grants
district courts authority to “adopt and amend rules governing its practice,” so long as such rules are “consistent with . . . federal statutes and
rules” adopted under the Rules Enabling Act. 341 District courts have
used these local rules to engage in “procedural innovation” 342 in order
to serve the Federal Rules’ objectives of “secur[ing] the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” 343 In
sum, while uniformity has its benefits, there is also value in permitting

337
See id. at 183 (“The inevitable disclosure doctrine is controversial primarily because it
has the potential to upset the balance that courts have traditionally tried to achieve in employment cases, and because, at its core, it appears to go against a fundamental tenet of employment law: the at-will doctrine.”).
338
See On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete
Law, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 833, 837–38 (2013) (“[A] rising number of empirical studies . . . suggest that lesser constraints on employee mobility may increase economic growth
and innovation.”).
339
Cf. Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62
U. Kan. L. Rev. 487, 498–99 (2013) (noting the local nature of innovation).
340
For one recent effort to assess the inevitable disclosure doctrine’s impact, see generally
I.P.L. Png & Sampsa Samila, Trade Secrets Law and Engineer/Scientist Mobility: Evidence
from “Inevitable Disclosure” (May 2013), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
faculty/programs/searlecenter/events/entrepreneur/documents/Png_Samila_Inevitable_
Disclosure.pdf.
341
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1).
342
See A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1574, 1586 (1991) (“Absent a problem of inconsistency with the national rules, innovations at the district level, implemented by local rule, are not proscribed . . . .”).
343
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
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some degree of experimentation by preserving a state-law-based regime of trade secret protection.
B. Availability of a Federal Forum
Another proffered justification for federalizing trade secrecy is that
it would permit litigation of civil trade secret misappropriation claims
in a federal forum. 344 Proponents of federalization have cited several
advantages to litigating trade secret cases in federal court. One is the
availability of nationwide service of process, 345 which allows trade secret plaintiffs to avoid cumbersome state court procedures to obtain
relevant evidence from non-resident third parties. 346 Another advantage
is federal courts’ broader jurisdictional reach over foreign defendants
through the “national contacts” standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). 347 A third is the more liberal discovery rules in federal
court. 348 Finally, proponents of a federal forum contend that litigants
generally prefer federal courts because of their experience handling
complex IP and commercial disputes. 349
These claims carry some force. Federal courts offer a number of advantages to trade secret litigants that may not be available in state
courts. 350 As a “forum of excellence,” 351 federal trial courts offer litigants a “level of technical competence” that “generally will be superior
344

See Halligan, supra note 88, at 667–68.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2).
346
See Halligan, supra note 88, at 667–68 (“[A] skilled trade secrets practitioner looks for
a way to bring the case in federal court so he can serve nationwide subpoenas and proceed
with discovery anywhere in the country.” (footnote omitted)); Letter from Richard F. Phillips
to Victoria Espinel, supra note 144, at 2 (“By comparison to the federal courts, which can
compel nationwide service of process, state courts are not able to provide for prompt nationwide service of process to join parties and to secure testimony and other evidence.”);
Klapow, supra note 239, at 3 (asserting that “nationwide service of process . . . should make
third-party information more readily available at less expense”).
347
See Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin, 574 F.3d 1403, 1414 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Mwani v. Bin
Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 11–14 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
348
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, supra note 316, at 4.
349
See Almeling, supra note 8, at 795–96.
350
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, another advantage of litigating misappropriation claims in federal court is the availability of protective orders to prevent the disclosure of trade secrets during litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (permitting a protective order to be entered for “a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information”).
351
See Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44
DePaul L. Rev. 797, 797 (1995).
345
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to that of a given state trial forum,” 352 particularly for complex legal
issues like IP. In contrast, “[s]tate court judges are often ill-equipped
and sometimes even unwilling to address trade secret cases involving
technology.” 353
However, a civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation
under federal law is not necessary to receive the benefits of a federal
forum in many cases. For example, state law claims can be heard in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction. 354 This includes cases under
alienage jurisdiction, where a U.S. citizen (including a corporation or
unincorporated association) can bring a claim against a citizen of a foreign state, 355 which is particularly useful in cases involving trade secret
misappropriation by foreign entities. 356
In addition, supplemental jurisdiction is another route into federal
court for state law trade secret claims. Under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 357 a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a state law
claim that arises out of a “common nucleus of operative fact” with a
352

Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1120 (1977).
Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrecy and Common Law Confidentiality: The Problem of
Multiple Regimes, in The Law and Theory of Trade Secrecy: A Handbook of Contemporary
Research 77, 102 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011).
354
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012); see also Almeling et al., supra note 251, at 297 (noting
that trade secret cases can be heard in federal court through diversity or supplemental jurisdiction); William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations
from the Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 Rev. Litig. 729, 775 (2010) (“[A] trade secret plaintiff seeking to proceed in federal court must first establish federal subject matter
jurisdiction . . . such as . . . diversity jurisdiction.”). For examples of recent federal cases using diversity jurisdiction to hear state law trade secret misappropriation claims, see MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 2012); ClearOne Communications, Inc. v.
Biamp Systems, 653 F.3d 1163, 1169–70 (10th Cir. 2011); Reg Seneca, LLC v. Harden, 938
F. Supp. 2d 852, 857–58 (S.D. Iowa 2013); Success Systems, Inc. v. Lynn, No. 3:06-cv-1117
(RNC), 2013 WL 810540, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 5, 2013); Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. v.
Wesley Fin. Grp., LLC, No. 3:12-cv-559, 2013 WL 785938, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28,
2013); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Juhasz, 924 F. Supp. 2d 893, 897 (N.D. Ohio 2013); E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Industries, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 2d 340, 356 (E.D. Va.
2012).
355
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(3).
356
For examples of federal cases involving alienage jurisdiction over state law trade secret
misappropriation claims, see K-V Pharmaceutical. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d
588, 591 (8th Cir. 2011); CYBERsitter, L.L.C. v. People’s Republic of China, 805
F. Supp. 2d 958, 962–63 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co.,
No. 09-cv-451-JL, 2010 WL 174315, at *1 (D.N.H. Jan. 14, 2010); Sterling International,
Inc. v. Virtools Canada, Inc., No. CV-06-0059-AAM, 2006 WL 2035515, at *1 (E.D. Wash.
July 18, 2006).
357
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).
353
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federal cause of action. 358 One way to raise trade secret claims in federal court via supplemental jurisdiction is by coupling a claim of patent
infringement with a state law claim for misappropriation of trade secret
information involving know-how related to the patented invention. 359
Other federal causes of action that have given rise to supplemental jurisdiction over trade secret claims include copyright infringement, 360
violations of federal antitrust law, 361 and violations of the CFAA. 362
The federal removal statute makes the election of a federal forum in
trade secret litigation an option for both parties. 363 If a plaintiff files a
trade secret claim in state court, and federal jurisdiction would have
been proper, then the defendant can exercise its option to immediately
remove the case to federal court (unless the plaintiff sued in the defendant’s home state). 364 This option can be invoked, for example, if an
out-of-state defendant perceives that a local forum would be biased
358
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (establishing the
“common nucleus of operative fact” test). In addition, a separate jurisdictional provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1338(b) (2012), provides that federal district courts have jurisdiction over “any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related
claim under the copyright, patent . . . or trademark laws.” Trade secret misappropriation can
qualify as “unfair competition” under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b). See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v.
Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 429 n.4 (3d Cir. 1982); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1328–29 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
359
See, e.g., Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Rhone-Poulenc Specialites Chimiques v. SCM Corp., 769 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
see also J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 917, 944 (2011) (explaining that “patentees in certain industries can disclose enough information to obtain a patent . . . . yet retain certain trade secret know-how or show-how that is required to effectively
practice the invention”); Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48 Washburn L.J. 1, 28–31 (2008) (describing the relationship between
patent and trade secret protection). However, district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if they conclude that the state law claim (such as trade secrecy) “substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction” (such as patent infringement). 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) (2012).
360
See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir. 1989); Kupferberg,
Goldberg & Niemark, L.L.C. v. Father & Son Pizza, Ltd., No. 95 C 3690, 1997 WL 158332,
at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1997).
361
See, e.g., Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 623, 629 (7th Cir. 1971).
362
See, e.g., Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com, L.L.C., 386 F.3d 930, 932–33 (9th
Cir. 2004); Unified Brands, Inc. v. Teders, 868 F. Supp. 2d 572, 576 n.1 (S.D. Miss. 2012).
See generally Liccardi, supra note 106 (discussing how the CFAA can be used as a vehicle
for litigating trade secrets in federal court).
363
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012); see also Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against
Removal, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 609, 611 (2004) (“Removal . . . serves . . . to ensure that plaintiffs alone do not decide which cases federal courts hear.” (footnote omitted)).
364
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
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against it, 365 or if the defendant is a large corporation facing a plaintifffriendly state court jury. 366
An empirical study by David Almeling and several co-authors confirms that a substantial number of state trade secret claims are currently
heard in federal court. 367 Studying a randomly-selected sample of federal
court decisions on trade secret misappropriation from 1950–2007, as
well as all federal court decisions in 2008, they found “[t]he amount and
importance of trade secret litigation [occurring in federal courts] is exploding.” 368 In particular, they found “exponential growth” in federal
trade secret cases, doubling between 1988 and 1995, and doubling again
between 1995 and 2004. 369
However, the benefits of litigating trade secret cases in a federal forum are not unalloyed. One drawback is the expense associated with the
liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 370
Discovery in trade secret litigation is not cheap; a recent survey of IP
lawyers found that 2013 median litigation costs through the end of discovery ranged from $250,000 in cases where less than $1 million was at
stake, to $1.9 million in cases where over $25 million was at risk. 371
Another disadvantage of exclusive federal jurisdiction over trade secret claims is that it may further burden an already-busy federal judiciary. 372 Many federal district courts in states with the highest number of

365
See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 369, 409 (1992) (finding that a
majority of randomly surveyed defense attorneys perceived that “bias against out-of-state
litigants was present in their cases”).
366
See id. at 412 (finding that approximately 45% of surveyed defense attorneys perceived
a “[b]ias against business status”); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do
Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal
Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 581, 594 tbl.1 (1998) (finding that the win rate in original
diversity cases is 71%, but in removed diversity cases it is only 34%).
367
Almeling et al., supra note 251, at 298–99, 301–02.
368
Id. at 301.
369
Id. at 293, 301.
370
See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 Duke L.J. 547, 549 (2010) (“By some estimates, discovery costs now comprise between fifty and ninety percent of the total litigation costs in a case.” (footnote omitted)).
371
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Economic Survey 2013, at 36, I-183, I185 (2013). One limitation of this study is that it does not disaggregate between trade secret
litigation in federal and state courts.
372
But see Almeling, supra note 8, at 794 (contending that a federal trade secrets act
“[w]ould [n]ot [o]verburden the [f]ederal [j]udiciary”).
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trade secret cases—California, New York, Ohio, and Texas 373—have
longer-than-median pending time for disposing of civil cases. 374 In many
of these courts, the median time to trial for civil cases exceeded two
years. 375 This is particularly important because speed often is of the essence in trade secret cases, as delay can result in irreparable harm if the
misappropriated information is publicly disclosed or used by a competitor. 376
C. International Treaty Obligations
A third argument advanced for federalizing trade secrecy is that federal legislation is required to comply with the United States’s obligations
under international trade law. 377 Specifically, some proponents of federalization contend that certain state trade secret laws do not satisfy the requirements of two multilateral trade agreements, the North American
Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) 378 and the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”). 379
NAFTA and TRIPS both contain minimum substantive standards for
trade secret protection. 380 The standard for establishing a trade secret in
both agreements is similar, requiring member states to protect infor373

Almeling et al., supra note 250, at 74 & tbl.4.
See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, at
tbl.C-5 (2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2014/tables/C05Mar14.pdf (Last visited Mar. 16, 2015)
(showing the median interval from filing to disposition of civil cases in all federal district
courts was 8.6 months, compared to 8.8 months in the Eastern District of California; 11.0
months in the Northern District of New York; 8.6 months in the Eastern District of New
York; 9.4 months in the Western District of New York; 9.6 months in the Southern District
of Ohio; and 9.1 months in the Eastern District of Texas).
375
See id. (stating the median time to trial is 28.4 months in the Northern District of California, 31.5 in the Eastern District of California, 27.0 months in the Southern District of California, 34.5 months in the Northern District of New York, 34.7 months in the Eastern District of New York, 30.9 months in the Southern District of New York, 31.5 months in the
Western District of New York, 29.4 months in the Southern District of Ohio, and 26.1
months in the Eastern District of Texas).
376
See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet,
2007 Wis. L. Rev. 1041, 1043 (“Given that secrecy is vital to preserving trade-secret status,
time is of the essence to trade-secret owners . . . .”).
377
Lao, supra note 53, at 1674–79; Pace, supra note 51, at 449–56.
378
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat.
2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
379
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
380
Halligan, supra note 88, at 671; Lao, supra note 53, at 1675–76.
374
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mation that (1) is not “generally known among or readily accessible to
persons that normally deal with the kind of information in question,” 381
(2) has “commercial value because it is secret,” 382 and (3) was subject to
“reasonable steps under the circumstances to keep it secret.” 383 NAFTA
and TRIPS also require member states to provide legal means to prevent
unauthorized disclosure, acquisition, or use of a trade secret. 384 These
standards are consistent with the UTSA, which was the model for both
provisions. 385
However, advocates of federalization have argued that “the Restatement provisions on trade secrets are less protective” and thus “states that
continue to abide by Restatement rules may fall short of the minimum
standards established in NAFTA and TRIPS.” 386 In particular, they point
to the Restatement’s “continuous use” requirement as inconsistent with

381

Compare TRIPS, supra note 379, art. 39(2)(a) (requiring protection of information not
“generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally
deal with the kind of information in question”), with NAFTA, supra note 378, art. 1711
§ 1(a) (requiring protection of information not “generally known among or readily accessible
to persons that normally deal with the kind of information in question”).
382
Compare TRIPS, supra note 379, art. 39(2)(b) (requiring protection of information with
“commercial value because it is secret”), with NAFTA, supra note 378, art. 1711 § 1(b) (requiring protection of information with “actual or potential commercial value because it is
secret”).
383
Compare TRIPS, supra note 379, art. 39(2)(c) (requiring that the protected information
“has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances . . . to keep it secret”), with
NAFTA, supra note 378, art. 1711 § 1(c) (requiring that the trade secret owner has “taken
reasonable steps under the circumstances to keep it secret”). One additional requirement in
NAFTA is that the trade secret must be in tangible form. See NAFTA, supra note 378, art.
1711 § 2 (“A Party may require that to qualify for protection a trade secret must be evidenced in documents, electronic or magnetic means, optical discs, microfilms, films or other
similar instruments.”); Lao, supra note 53, at 1677 n.248.
384
Compare TRIPS, supra note 379, art. 39(2) (“[P]ersons shall have the possibility of
preventing information lawfully within their control from being [unlawfully] disclosed to,
acquired by, or used by others . . . .”), with NAFTA, supra note 378, art. 1711 § 1 (“Each
Party shall provide the legal means for any person to prevent trade secrets from being [unlawfully] disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others . . . .”).
385
See Lao, supra note 53, at 1677 (“[S]tates that have adopted the UTSA without restrictive modifications are generally in compliance with the international accords.”); see also
Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of Trade Secret Law: Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement
and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act on Which It Is Based, in The Law and Theory of Trade
Secrecy: A Handbook of Contemporary Research, supra note 353, at 537, 538 (“Subsections
(a) through (c) of Article 39(2) [of TRIPS] are modeled after the definition of ‘trade secret’
that is contained in the [UTSA] . . . .”).
386
Lao, supra note 53, at 1677.
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NAFTA and TRIPS. 387 In addition, they argue that some states’ modifications to the UTSA potentially conflict with these treaties. 388
These claims are unpersuasive. As previously discussed, the “continuous use” requirement is largely disregarded in modern trade secret jurisprudence. 389 More importantly, proponents of federalization are unable to point to any actual controversy arising from the United States’s
alleged noncompliance with NAFTA or TRIPS. For instance, there has
been no criticism by the United States’s major trading partners regarding
the level of protection provided under state trade secret laws. 390 Thus, as
the USPTO has explained, the United States effectively “fulfills its obligation[s] by offering trade secret protection under state laws.” 391
D. A National Regime for IP Rights
Finally, proponents of federalizing trade secrecy claim that it would
“achieve better innovation policy because it would consolidate in one
entity . . . all major categories of IP.” 392 In an information-based economy, they argue, trade secrets play an increasingly important role. 393
Thus, they contend that a national system governing all major forms of
IP protection, including trade secrecy, would be better suited to incentivize innovation than would fifty separate legal systems. 394

387
Id. at 1677–78; see also Pace, supra note 51, at 452–53 (noting that the definition of
trade secret in NAFTA and TRIPS is broader than the Restatement definition).
388
See Lao, supra note 53, at 1678 (arguing, in particular, that Iowa’s limitation of third
party liability to instances where the third party had actual knowledge of the improper acquisition is inconsistent with NAFTA and TRIPS); Pace, supra note 51, at 453 (same).
389
See supra text accompanying notes 282–85.
390
See Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, supra note 316, at 4 (stating that the AIPLA
Trade Secret Committee “has not been able to identify any criticism of the trade secret protection provided within the United States by any of the United States’ trading partners”).
391
Office of Policy & External Affairs: Patent Trade Secrets, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/patents/ir_pat_tradesecret.jsp (last visited Dec. 1,
2014).
392
Almeling, supra note 8, at 789–90.
393
See Almeling, supra note 259, at 1104 (“Trade secrets matter more than ever because
trade secrets . . . play an expanding role in the American economy.”); Pace, supra note 51, at
448 (“As the United States economy becomes increasingly information-driven . . . the types
of trade secrets . . . are likely to increase exponentially.”).
394
See Almeling, supra note 8, at 791; Lao, supra note 53, at 1635; Pace, supra note 51, at
448; cf. Anderson, supra note 359, at 921 (contending that “trade secrets and patents should
be viewed not as opposing systems of invention protection, but rather as complementary
tools for policy makers”).
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But federalization may in fact harm innovation by indirectly undermining a key objective of patent law: the disclosure of inventions. 395 As
the remainder of this Section explains, the strengthening of trade secret
protection via federalization likely will cause more inventors to opt out
of the patent system in favor of trade secret protection, ultimately reducing the amount of available information about patentable inventions.
1. Choosing Between Trade Secrecy and Patenting
Innovators who develop a potentially patentable invention face the dilemma of deciding whether to seek protection for it under either trade
secret or patent law. 396 The two forms of protection are mutually exclusive because the public disclosure required to obtain a patent eliminates
any claim to secrecy on the same information. 397 Thus, if an innovator
395

See Lemley, supra note 9, at 333 (explaining that “dissemination . . . of new information is one of the goals of the patent system”). There is currently a robust debate among
IP scholars regarding the value and efficacy of patent law’s disclosure requirement. Compare
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 539, 541–43 (2009) (arguing that
“[p]atent disclosure is essential” and suggesting improvements “to strengthen patent disclosure”), and Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2012) (rejecting
“the idea that patents serve little to no disclosure function . . . by pointing to other disclosures of information that would not occur in the absence of a patent system”), and Sean B.
Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 621, 627 (2010) (considering “teaching as an important function of the patent system”), with Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. Rev. 123, 125–26 (2006) (contending that
the assumed “benefit[s] of disclosure . . . in the quid pro quo view of patents . . . may not be
warranted” and that “the enabling disclosures in patents do not serve a teaching function particularly well”), and Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 19, 21–22
(stating that companies generally ignore patents in all stages of product development), and
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech.
531, 534 & n.11 (2012) (finding that a minority of nanotechnology researchers surveyed reported obtaining useful technical information from a patent). See generally Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2007, 2007
(2005) (examining “the potential value of the patent system’s disclosure function and
stud[ying] the reasons why the U.S. patent system appears to be failing in its ascribed role of
disseminating information”). A comprehensive evaluation of this issue is outside the scope
of this Article.
396
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487–88 (1974) (discussing the
choice between patenting or trade secrecy); Anderson, supra note 359, at 922–27 (same);
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 623, 636
(2013) (“[T]here is a substantial realm of overlap where either trade secrecy or a patent
could work to protect an owner’s exclusive use of valuable information, and a decision between these alternative forms of IP protection must be made.” (footnote omitted)).
397
See BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc., 463 F.3d 702, 706–07 (7th Cir.
2006) (“Publication in a patent destroys the trade secret because patents are intended to be
widely disclosed . . . .” (internal citation omitted)); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
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develops a patent-eligible invention, he or she must determine on a caseby-case basis which regime would “provide[] the best protection.” 398
Currently, trade secrecy is a broad but fragile form of protection for
IP. It is broad because it potentially covers any business-related information that has at least some value from not being widely known or easily learned. 399 However, trade secret protection also is fragile because it
can be easily lost—for instance, through intentional or accidental disclosure of the secret by the owner or others entrusted to maintain its secrecy, or through the acts of unrelated third parties, such as independent
discovery or reverse engineering. 400 If a trade secret exists and misappropriation occurs, however, the owner can invoke a powerful arsenal of
remedies, including injunctive relief, compensatory damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees. 401 Moreover, trade secrecy is “theoretically unlimited in duration, lasting as long as the information remains a
trade secret.” 402

tion § 39 cmt. f (1995) (“[I]nformation that is disclosed in a patent . . . does not qualify for
protection [as a trade secret].”); see also Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode
Trade Secrets, 15 Yale J.L. & Tech. 1, 3 (2012) (“Traditionally, trade secrecy and patent
rights have been considered mutually exclusive.” (footnote omitted)). There is a limited exception to this rule: An invention may be held as a trade secret during the time between the
filing of a patent application and its subsequent publication or issuance as a patent by the
USPTO. See Anderson, supra note 359, at 923 n.19 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 122(a)–(b)(1)(A)
(2006)).
398
Anderson, supra note 359, at 923.
399
See UTSA, supra note 17, § 1(4); see also Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 Hamline L. Rev. 545, 546 (2010) (“Naked statements of blackletter doctrine seem to
indicate that trade secret subject matter is very broad.”); Rowe, supra note 376, at 1050
(“Part of the appeal of choosing trade-secret protection . . . is the broad scope of protectable
information and the relative ease with which a business can claim such protection.” (footnote
omitted)).
400
See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 490–91; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 57, 57–58
(2004) (explaining the vulnerability of trade secrets to disclosure, independent discovery,
and reverse engineering).
401
See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of TechnologyIntensive Firms, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1649, 1676 (2009) (“[I]f misappropriation of a trade secret can be proven, a variety of remedies become[] available to the holder, including injunctive relief and damages.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 59–67 (describing remedies available under the UTSA).
402
Nova Chems., Inc. v. Sekisui Plastics Co., 579 F.3d 319, 327 (3d Cir. 2009); see also
Schwartz, supra note 396, at 630 (“[W]hile a patent offers protection for a specified term of
years, a trade secret has no built-in expiration date.” (footnote omitted)).
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In contrast, patent law is usually “viewed as conferring a more robust
form of protection.” 403 If the statutory requirements of novelty, utility,
and nonobviousness are satisfied, 404 then a patent’s exclusive rights “operate[] against the world, forbidding any use of the invention” during its
lifetime 405—currently, twenty years from the filing date of the relevant
patent application. 406 Furthermore, unlike in trade secrecy, reverse engineering and independent invention are not defenses to patent infringement. 407
In exchange for these more robust rights, the inventor must disclose
sufficient information to teach others skilled in the relevant field of
technology how to practice the invention. 408 In other words, public disclosure is “part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain.” 409 As the Supreme Court explained in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.:
In return for the right of exclusion—this “reward for inventions”—the patent laws impose upon the inventor a requirement
of disclosure. To insure adequate and full disclosure . . . the patent laws require that the patent application shall include a full
403
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1585, 1593 (1998).
404
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining patentable subject matter as “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”); id. § 103 (requiring a patented
invention be nonobvious).
405
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 490 (internal quotation marks omitted).
406
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). However, this duration can be terminated earlier by the
patent owner’s failure to pay maintenance fees at four-, eight-, and twelve-year intervals after the patent’s issuance. Id. § 41(b)(1)–(2). Only about half of patentees pay all three
maintenance fees. Dennis Crouch, USPTO Maintenance Fees, PatentlyO.com (Feb. 12,
2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/02/uspto-maintenance-fees.html.
407
See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 306, at 1584 (“No reverse engineering
right, as such, exists in patent law.” (footnote omitted)); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 475, 475 (2006) (“Under
current law, independent invention is no defense to patent infringement.”). The Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act created a limited exception to this rule, permitting an individual or entity that commercially used a process, including an independently invented process, as a trade
secret to continue its use even after issuance of a patent on the same invention, or public disclosure of a patent application that was subsequently filed. See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
408
See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.”).
409
AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (“[E]xclusive patent
rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public.”).
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and clear description of the invention and “of the manner and
process of making and using it” so that any person skilled in the
art may make and use the invention. . . . [S]uch additions to the
general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public
weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price
of 17 years of exclusive use for its disclosure. 410

Disclosure permits the public to use the information in the patent to
practice the invention after the patent term has expired. 411 And even before the patent’s expiration, “scientists can learn from the patent disclosure and use that information to improve on the invention or to design
around it.” 412 Furthermore, patent law can facilitate what Professor Jason
Rantanen calls “peripheral disclosure”—the dissemination of information outside the four corners of the patent, such as scientific publications, due to the availability of patent protection. 413
Facing these alternatives, there are a number of reasons why an inventor might forego patent protection in favor of trade secrecy. Some reasons why innovators might favor trade secrecy over patenting include
the cost, delay, and uncertainty associated with prosecuting a patent application; 414 the even greater cost of enforcing an issued patent in litigation; 415 the risk of losing exclusivity if the patent is found invalid; 416 and
410
416 U.S. at 480–81 (footnote and internal citations omitted). The present term of a patent has since been amended and is currently 20 years from the filing date of the patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
411
Lemley, supra note 9, at 332. But see Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of
Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 401, 410 (2010) (arguing that “the information-revealing function of the patent system is largely illusory”).
412
Lemley, supra note 9, at 332.
413
Rantanen, supra note 395, at 21–37.
414
See Anderson, supra note 359, at 925; Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting
by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 111, 115, 166–
67 & fig.5 (2010) (indicating that the cost of acquiring a patent was a significant deterrent to
seeking patent protection, according to a survey of startup companies); Data Visualization
Center: Patents Dashboard, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/
dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (stating that as of January 2015, the average total pendency of patent applications is 26.8 months).
415
See Lemley, supra note 9, at 331 (“[P]atent litigation is as much as three times as expensive as trade secret litigation.”); Sichelman & Graham, supra note 414, at 166–67 & fig.5
(finding that a top reason for innovators to forgo patenting was “the cost of enforcing the
patent”).
416
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 205 & fig.1 (1998) (finding that in a study of reported
patent validity decisions over an eight-year period, 46% of litigated patents were held invalid). But cf. Robert Smyth, White Paper Report: United States Patent Invalidity Study 2012
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the absence of any formal registration mechanism or requirement for a
trade secret. 417
Notably, the recently-enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(“AIA”) 418 included several changes that make trade secrecy more attractive vis-à-vis patent protection. The AIA expanded prior user rights
by creating a defense against patent infringement for any entity that
commercially used an invention at least one year before the patent’s filing date or public disclosure, including information used in secret to
produce a commercial product. 419 It also effectively abolished the best
mode requirement, 420 meaning that some inventors may be able to pursue patent protection while simultaneously preserving information about
the perceived best method of implementing the invention as a trade secret. 421
2. Strengthening Trade Secrecy via Federalization
Adopting a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation would likely further strengthen trade secret protection. 422 First, it
would put trade secrecy on par with patent law regarding the availability
of a federal forum. A federal statute would allow trade secret holders to
invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction for misappropriation claims

(Sept. 2012), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Smyth_USPatentInvalidity_Sept12.pdf
(finding that 86% of asserted patents were held invalid in federal district court cases from
2007–11).
417
Anderson, supra note 359, at 925.
418
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.).
419
35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012); see also Dmitry Karshtedt, Did Learned Hand Get It
Wrong?: The Questionable Patent Forfeiture Rule of Metallizing Engineering, 57 Vill. L.
Rev. 261, 333–34 (2012) (contending the AIA’s prior user rights “appear to encourage trade
secrecy” in lieu of patenting because “while the owner of a trade secret may still end up facing the patenting of the same invention by a subsequent inventor, he or she now has a new
defense against infringement of the patent”).
420
See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (2012) (providing that “failure to disclose the best mode
shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable”).
421
Love & Seaman, supra note 397, at 3–4.
422
See Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic
Trade Secret Rights in Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 Yale J.L. & Tech. 172, 206
(2014) (“[D]ue to Congress’s one-sided concern with protecting trade secrets, any federal
civil trade secret law enacted now is likely to grant much stronger rights to trade secret holders than existing state law.”).
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falling within the statute’s scope and thus receive the benefits of litigating in federal court. 423
Second, federalization would likely provide stronger remedies. Preliminary injunctive relief is “quite common in trade secret cases.” 424 The
misappropriation of a trade secret often creates irreparable injury, 425
which is “the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.” 426 As the Supreme Court has explained, “the
right to exclude others is central” to trade secrecy because “[o]nce the
data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest.” 427 In contrast, obtaining injunctive relief has become more
difficult in patent cases after the Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., which eliminated the “general rule” that a permanent injunction should issue after a final judgment in favor of the patentee. 428 In addition, pending legislation would create a powerful preliminary remedy for trade secret holders by authorizing ex parte seizures
of evidence related to misappropriation claims. 429
Third, federalizing trade secrecy would create more robust rights
against extraterritorial conduct compared to patent law. There is a “general rule under United States patent law that no infringement occurs
when a patented product is made and sold in another country.” 430 A limited exception to this rule is found in Section 271(f) of the Patent Act,

423

See supra notes 344–353 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 354–70 and accompanying text.
424
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 229 (1998).
425
See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.
1984) (holding that “the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages”); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Pizzirani, 462 F. Supp. 2d 648, 658 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (“It is well established that irreparable harm is presumed where a trade secret has been misappropriated.” (citation omitted)); 1 Jager, supra note 31, § 7:5 (“[I]f the information in suit rises to the level
of a protectable trade secret, the requisite irreparable harm is established for a preliminary
injunction.”).
426
1 Jager, supra note 31, § 7:5.
427
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984).
428
547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
429
See supra notes 162, 182–86 and accompanying text.
430
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007). For instance, § 271(a) of
the Patent Act contains an express territorial restriction prohibiting an infringer from making, using, offering to sell, or selling “any patented invention, within the United States or
import[ing] into the United States any patented invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (emphases added).
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which imposes liability for supplying “any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention” with knowledge that “such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if
such combination occurred within the United States.” 431 However, the
Supreme Court has interpreted Section 271(f) narrowly by continuing to
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality in patent law. 432
In contrast, pending legislation to federalize trade secrecy would expressly authorize its application outside the United States’s borders. The
DTSA would create a civil cause of action for violations of the EEA, 433
which expressly applies “to conduct occurring outside the United States”
when (1) “the offender is a natural person who is a [U.S.] citizen” or
lawful permanent resident, or an organization organized under U.S. law
or any state law, or when (2) some “act in furtherance of the offense was
committed in the United States.” 434 Similarly, the FAIR Act would apply
“outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” when unlawful
conduct, “either by itself or in combination with conduct within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, causes or is reasonably anticipated to cause an injury” either “(1) within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States; or (2) to a United States person.” 435 Ultimately, “broadening the scope of trade secret misappropriation to . . . extraterritorial actions” will create “additional incentive[s] to inventors to keep their innovation secret,” thus “den[ying] society the benefits of disclosure
stemming from the patent system.” 436

431

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). This section also imposes liability for inducement of infringement abroad where “all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention”
are “supplied in or from the United States.” Id. § 271(f)(1).
432
See Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 442 (“Recognizing that § 271(f) is an exception to the
general rule that our patent law does not apply extraterritorially, we resist giving the language in which Congress cast § 271(f) an expansive interpretation.”); see also Timothy R.
Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2119, 2130–36
(2008) (describing how “the Supreme Court has twice emphasized the presumption against
the extraterritorial application of U.S. patents”).
433
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
434
18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2012).
435
S. 1770, 113th Cong. § 3(c) (2013).
436
TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Moore, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, if trade secrecy is federalized, Congress may enact additional changes that further strengthen the rights of trade secret owners. 437
Recent history demonstrates that when Congress has principal authority
over an IP regime, it tends to strengthen IP owners’ rights, often at the
expense of end users. For instance, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 438 granted copyright holders an additional twenty years of
protection for all works, both new and existing, 439 despite scant evidence
that this extension would incentivize the creation of new works. 440
The most salient example of strengthening an IP regime through federalization is trademark law, which—like trade secrecy—was originally
governed by state law. State common law regarding trademarks and unfair competition 441 predated the adoption of the first federal trademark
statute in 1870, 442 which was struck down by the Supreme Court less
than a decade later. 443 Congress then passed more limited legislation
permitting federal registration of “technical” trademarks (meaning, inherently distinctive marks) used in interstate commerce. 444 But even
when a party obtained a federally-registered trademark, “its rights were
substantively determined by the common law” because pre-Lanham Act
federal laws “did not create trademark rights,” but rather merely authorized “means for enforcing [common law] rights through a federal cause
of action.” 445

437
See Graves, supra note 353, at 106 (contending that “[a] federal solution [to trade secret
law] might . . . be worse than the currently-existing problems” because “lobbying efforts by
self-described industry groups might distort a federal bill in directions opposed to promoting
innovation”).
438
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
439
Id. § 102(b)–(d) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–04 (2012)).
440
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254–57, app. at 267–69 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
441
Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1839, 1859 n.82 (2007).
442
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, invalidated by The Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82 (1879).
443
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 99.
444
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 724, 726; see also Mary LaFrance, Understanding Trademark Law § 1.04 (2d ed. 2009) (“The 1905 Act permitted registration only of
‘technical’ trademarks—that is, marks that were inherently distinctive—thus excluding descriptive marks and most types of trade dress regardless of their degree of acquired distinctiveness.”).
445
Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in Intellectual Property and the
Common Law, supra note 251, at 288, 291.
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Under this state-law-based regime, “the common law of trademark
and unfair competition was substantially uniform across jurisdictions.” 446 Despite this—and in a clear parallel to the present debate regarding trade secrecy—advocates for federalization argued that “uniform national trademark laws were needed” because of the possibility of
differing state law protection. 447 The resulting federal legislation, the
Lanham Act, created broad protection under federal law for both registered and unregistered trademarks. 448 However, the Lanham Act generally does not preempt parallel state law, thus permitting both federal and
state law remedies. 449
Trademark law’s federalization ultimately resulted in strengthened
trademark rights. As Professor Mark McKenna has explained, the incomplete federalization of trademark law by the Lanham Act resulted in
a “one-way ratchet”—states remain free to “grant[] broader rights than
are available under federal law,” but due to conflict preemption, they
cannot limit federally granted rights. 450 The most famous example of this
one-way ratchet is the creation of a federal cause of action for dilution of
so-called “famous marks.” Trademark dilution claims were first recognized under state law shortly after the Lanham Act’s passage. 451 By the
mid-1990s, approximately half of the states had adopted some level of
protection against trademark dilution. 452 This patch-quilt system of protection spurred Congress to adopt a federal cause of action against

446

Id. at 296.
Id. at 306–07; see also H. Peter Nesvold & Lisa M. Pollard, Essay, Half a Century of
Federal Trademark Protection: The Lanham Act Turns Fifty, 7 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media
& Ent. L.J. 49, 50 n.4 (1996) (“The Lanham Act sought to remedy the problems arising
from . . . the lack of a uniform federal trademark law which resulted in, among other things,
business persons having differing trademark rights in the varying states.” (citation omitted)).
448
Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1127 (2012)).
449
See JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 919 (7th Cir. 2007) (“In the area of
trademark law, preemption is the exception rather than the rule.”); see also John T. Cross,
The Role of the States in United States Trademark Law, 49 U. Louisville L. Rev. 485, 486
(2011) (“[T]he Lanham Act . . . has very little preemptive scope.”).
450
McKenna, supra note 445, at 305.
451
The first trademark dilution law was enacted by Massachusetts in 1947. LaFrance, supra note 444, § 3.06 (citing Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as
amended at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110H, § 13 (West 2012))).
452
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3–4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030–31.
447
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trademark dilution, 453 ostensibly for the purpose of “bring[ing] uniformity and consistency to the protection of famous marks.” 454 Federal dilution claims were further strengthened in 2006 when Congress eliminated
the requirement that a trademark owner must establish actual confusion
by consumers. 455
Ultimately, the proposed, albeit incomplete, federalization of trade
secret law through legislation like the DTSA would create a federal
“floor” for the level of trade secret protection. And similar to trademark
law, over time this would likely result in stronger rights and remedies
for trade secret owners.
3. Federalization’s Impact on Disclosure of Patentable Inventions
Stronger protection for trade secrets via federalization will likely negatively impact innovation by reducing the amount of disclosure of patent-eligible inventions. 456 As Professor Mark Lemley has explained, the
existence of trade secret law actually facilitates disclosure by serving “as
a substitute for the physical and contractual restrictions [trade secret
owners] would otherwise impose in an effort to prevent competitors
from acquiring their information.” 457 If no legal protection existed for
trade secrets, firms would be less willing to share trade secret information even when it would be advantageous to do so, such as when contracting out manufacturing or other functions to more efficient third parties or sharing information as part of a joint venture with another firm. 458

453

Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1125, 1127 (2012)).
454
H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
455
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1125, 1127).
456
Cf. Argento, supra note 422, at 213 (contending that “broadly strengthening trade secret
laws will likely harm innovation and the economy with little compensating benefit”).
457
Lemley, supra note 9, at 313. Professor Lemley’s argument echoes the majority opinion
in Kewanee Oil Co., which explains that “if state trade secret protection were precluded,” a
“holder of a trade secret would not likely share his secret” with others due to the absence of a
“binding legal obligation to pay a license fee or to protect the secret. The result would be to
hoard rather than disseminate knowledge.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
486 (1974). But see Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92
Tex. L. Rev. 1803, 1817–19 (2014) (critiquing Lemley’s argument that trade secrecy enhances disclosure).
458
See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 486–87 (contending that without trade secrecy, “the
trade secret holder would tend either to limit [its] utilization of the invention, thereby depriving the public of the maximum benefit of its use, or engage in the time-consuming and eco-
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Some information will always be disclosed through patenting, regardless of the level of trade secret protection. For example, inventors usually will protect “inherently self-disclosing inventions”—such as inventions that can be reverse engineered with little or no effort—through
patenting because trade secrecy would provide no meaningful protection. 459 And, even under a federal regime that provides strong protection
for trade secrets, disclosure would not be reduced regarding nonpatentable knowledge that is kept secret, such as client lists, mailing
lists, and “negative know-how,” because patent protection is not available for this information. 460
Too much trade secret protection, however, also may reduce disclosure regarding patentable inventions. If the alternative of robust trade
secret rights causes a substantial number of inventors to rely on trade secrecy instead of patenting, then the aggregate amount of information
available to the public will decrease. 461 Thus, the strength of trade secret
protection has a bell curve-like effect on disclosure. Nonexistent or
weak protection for trade secrets will result in less disclosure regarding
patentable innovations, but so will overly strong trade secret protection.
In sum, there is significant reason to be concerned that the federalization of trade secrecy would decrease the level of disclosure about patentable inventions, ultimately harming innovation.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO FEDERALIZATION: EXPANDING FEDERAL
COURTS’ JURISDICTION OVER STATE LAW TRADE SECRET CLAIMS
In lieu of federalization, this Article proposes an alternative approach
to enhance protection against trade secret theft: a limited expansion of
federal jurisdiction over trade secret litigation. This Part discusses sever-

nomically wasteful enterprise of constructing duplicative manufacturing and marketing
mechanisms for the exploitation of the invention”).
459
Lemley, supra note 9, at 338–39.
460
See Anderson, supra note 359, at 945 (describing “business survey information, customer data, and laboratory data” as “secret information” that is “outside of patentable subject
matter”); see also Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions Meeting
Judicial Standards of Patentability, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 807, 820 (1974) (“[T]rade secret protection of unpatentable inventions cannot be said to damage the general federal patent policy of
encouraging innovation.”).
461
Cf. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he existence of
trade secret protection provides in some instances a substantial disincentive to entrance into
the patent system, and thus deprives society of the benefits of public disclosure of the invention which it is the policy of the patent laws to encourage”).
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al approaches that would at least modestly expand the jurisdiction of district courts over state law trade secret misappropriation claims.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
One limitation of the existing state-law-based system of trade secrecy
is that litigants cannot rely on federal question jurisdiction 462 to have
their disputes decided in federal court. Instead, they must rely on other
sources of authority, such as diversity jurisdiction or supplemental jurisdiction. 463 While federal subject matter jurisdiction exists for a significant number of trade secret disputes, 464 others miss out on the numerous
benefits to litigating trade secret claims in federal court 465 because they
are governed by state rather than federal law. 466
One way to expand the pool of litigants who can avail themselves of
the “forum of excellence” of a federal court without adopting a federal
cause of action is to alter the requirements for hearing trade secret
claims under federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction. Like most claims arising under state law, there must be complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants under the diversity jurisdiction statute. 467 But
complete diversity is not constitutionally required. 468 Under Article III
of the Constitution, federal jurisdiction is permissible in cases where
parties that are citizens of the same state are on both sides of the dispute,
so long as there is at least one party who has a different citizenship from
all other adverse parties. 469 This requirement, called “minimal diversity,”

462

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
See supra text accompanying notes 354–63.
464
See supra text accompanying notes 367–70.
465
See supra text accompanying notes 344–54.
466
See Almeling et al., supra note 250, at 62–65 (finding over 358 trade secrets cases in
state appellate courts between 1995–2009); see also Schaller, supra note 354, at 775 (“As in
any other case, a trade secret plaintiff seeking to proceed in federal court must first establish
federal subject matter jurisdiction.”).
467
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267–68
(1806).
468
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (“In Strawbridge v. Curtiss, this Court held that the diversity of citizenship statute required ‘complete
diversity’ . . . . But Chief Justice Marshall there purported to construe only ‘The words of the
act of congress,’ not the Constitution itself.” (footnote and internal citation omitted)).
469
See id. at 531 (“Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.”
(footnote omitted)).
463
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is constitutionally sufficient for diversity jurisdiction. 470 Congress has
enacted a variety of statutes that authorize federal jurisdiction based on
minimal diversity. 471
Adopting a minimal diversity standard can expand federal subject
matter jurisdiction for trade secret misappropriation involving multiple
plaintiffs or defendants, at least in some circumstances. Consider the
common situation where several employees who have learned their employer’s trade secret information depart and start a new firm that competes with their old employer. 472 If the new firm is a citizen of the same
state as the former employer—for example, because both are incorporated under Delaware law 473—then diversity jurisdiction would be absent. But if at least one of the former employees is a citizen of a different
state than his or her previous employer, then the former employee could
be named as a defendant to create minimal diversity.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
In addition, in trade secret litigation, personal jurisdiction issues can
arise regarding foreign defendants who have allegedly committed an act
of misappropriation. 474 Under the Due Process Clause, 475 a court must
have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in order to ren470

Id. at 530–31.
See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 9
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012)); 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012) (statutory interpleader);
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116
Stat. 1758, 1826 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2012)); see also C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 Hastings L.J. 613, 616–31 (2004) (discussing recent legislation
regarding adoption of a minimal diversity standard in mass tort and class action litigation).
472
See Almeling et al., supra note 251, at 302 tbl.2 (finding that from 1950–2008 over half
of trade secret misappropriation litigation involved an employee or former employee of the
trade secret holder).
473
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every
State . . . by which it has been incorporated . . . .”); see also Forest Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury
Co., 452 F.2d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding that diversity jurisdiction did not exist between two Delaware corporations for a trade secret misappropriation claim, but holding that
pendent jurisdiction existed over the claim).
474
See, e.g., BP Chems., Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 259–62 (3d
Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over a Taiwanese corporation that allegedly misappropriated the plaintiff’s secret process for making acetic acid
by copying a plant design that plaintiff had previously licensed to a Chinese firm); B.E.E.
Int’l, Ltd. v. Hawes, 267 F. Supp. 2d 477, 486 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (dismissing trade secret
misappropriation and related federal and state law claims against a Belgian corporation, due
to a lack of personal jurisdiction).
475
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
471
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der a valid judgment in the action. 476 Unless there is general jurisdiction
based on the defendant’s residence or “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum that render the defendant “essentially at home in the
forum,” 477 specific jurisdiction must exist over the nonresident defendant. 478 This requires that the defendant commit “some act by which [it]
‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum . . . thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” 479
In state court, the relevant “forum” for the now-familiar “minimum contacts” analysis under International Shoe Co. v. Washington 480 and its
progeny is the state where the trial court sits. 481
One possibility for expanding access to a federal forum is adoption of
a “national contacts” approach for determining personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendants in trade secret cases. Currently, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure generally limit the territorial jurisdiction of federal district courts in diversity cases to that of the state courts of general jurisdiction where the federal court sits. 482 This means personal jurisdiction
depends on the defendant’s contacts with the particular state where the
federal court is located. 483 However, “[t]his limitation is a voluntary rather than obligatory restriction, given district courts’ status as courts of
the national sovereign.” 484 For instance, in federal question cases, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) authorizes personal jurisdiction based
on the defendant’s minimum contacts with the entire United States when
the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in any individual
state. 485

476
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) (citing Kulko v. Cal. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978)).
477
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
478
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787–88 (2011).
479
Id. at 2787 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
480
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
481
See J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (explaining that “personal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis,” and thus “a defendant may in
principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of any particular State”).
482
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
483
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Int’l Shoe Co., 326
U.S. at 320.
484
A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87
Denv. U. L. Rev. 325, 325 (2010).
485
See, e.g., Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d
1285, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Rule 4(k)(2) . . . allows a district court to exercise personal
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A “national contacts” standard could be adopted for claims of trade
secret theft, which would allow plaintiffs to rely upon the misappropriator’s contacts with the entire United States, rather than just the forum
state, to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 486 For example, a
“national contacts” standard could be useful in trade secret cases involving computer hacking originating from foreign countries, or when the
misappropriator’s unlawful conduct involves servers and computers located in multiple jurisdictions. 487 One of the most notorious examples of
this type of electronic intrusion is cyber-espionage using “bots,” which
are computers compromised by malicious software installed without
their owners’ knowledge. 488 A misappropriator with sufficient technical
skill can create and use a “botnet”—an informal network of hundreds or
thousands of bots controlled by the misappropriator 489—to test weaknesses in a secured network, to install malware that can transmit information stored on the network, and to conduct denial-of-service attacks to
slow down or cripple a server. 490 Under a “national contacts” standard,
the misappropriator’s exploitation of compromised bots in different
states could be aggregated to help establish personal jurisdiction.

jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whose contacts with the United States, but not with the
forum state, satisfy due process.”).
486
See Spencer, supra note 484, at 329–30 (making a similar proposal for diversity cases
generally).
487
See Jeffrey R. Armstrong, Guaranteed Jurisdiction: The Emerging Role of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(k)(2) in the Acquisition of Personal Jurisdiction of Foreign Nationals in Internet Intellectual Property Disputes, 5 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 63, 80 (2003).
488
See Microsoft Safety & Security Center, What Is a Botnet?, http://www.microsoft.com/
security/resources/botnet-whatis.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (“Criminals distribute malicious software (also known as malware) that can turn your computer into a bot (also known
as a zombie). When this occurs, your computer can perform automated tasks over the Internet, without you knowing it.”).
489
See Clay Wilson, Cong. Research Serv., RL32114, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress 5 (2008), available at https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/terror/RL32114.pdf (“Botnets . . . are made up of vast numbers of compromised computers that have been infected with malicious code, and can be remotely-controlled through
commands sent via the Internet.”); see also Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative
Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 429, 442
(2012) (“[C]ontrol of botnets consisting of thousands of computers can be purchased for just
a few hundred dollars.” (footnote omitted)).
490
Kesan & Hayes, supra note 489, at 443. In addition, the botnet’s use of compromised
computers can help a misappropriator evade detection by obfuscating the origin of the attack.
See id. (“Botnets offer attackers many advantages, such as helping them to evade detection
and enabling them to do more harm by controlling a large number of computers.” (footnote
omitted)).
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There are particularly compelling reasons to adopt a “national contacts” standard for trade secret misappropriation claims, as the misappropriation of a firm’s trade secrets may have negative consequences
that spread well beyond the boundaries of the forum state. 491 For instance, if a foreign automobile manufacturer misappropriates information about a domestic firm’s hybrid engine technology, it could adversely impact the domestic firm’s operations and employees in all
states where it has manufacturing, distribution, or sales facilities, as well
as those of the firms in its supply chain. 492 In circumstances where the
harm caused by trade secret misappropriation foreseeably affects multiple states, it does not seem logical to limit an assessment of the misappropriator’s contacts to a single state.
CONCLUSION
Trade secret misappropriation is a real threat to American businesses,
entrepreneurs, and the national economy. But the federalization of trade
secret law is not a panacea to this problem. Some proffered justifications
for federalization, such as the uniformity of trade secret law and the
availability of a federal forum, already exist to a large degree. Moreover,
there are significant potential drawbacks to federalization, including
precluding state experimentation regarding trade secret protection and
undermining the disclosure function of the patent system. In lieu of outright federalization, a modest expansion of federal courts’ jurisdiction
over state law trade secret claims can help address trade secret theft.

491

See Almeling, supra note 8, at 782.
For an example of a similar theft, see Matthew Dolan, Ex-Ford Engineer Pleads Guilty
in Trade-Secrets Case, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 2010, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748704648604575621111922168030.
492
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APPENDIX A: ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT

State

Year
Enacted

AL

1987

Ala. Code §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2013)

AK

1988

Alaska Stat. §§ 45.50.910 to .945 (2012)

AZ

1990

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-401 to -407 (2013)

AR

1981

Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (2011)

CA

1984

Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426.1 to 3426.11 (Deering 2005)

CO

1986

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-74-101 to -110 (2014)

CT

1983

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-50 to -58 (2013)

DE

1982

Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009 (2013)

DC

1989

D.C. Code §§ 36-401 to -410 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2014)

Citation

FL

1988

GA

1990

Fla. Stat. §§ 688.001 to .009 (2013)
Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-760 to -767 (2009)

HI

1989

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (LexisNexis 2012)

ID

1981

Idaho Code Ann. §§ 48-801 to -807 (2014)

IL

1987

765 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 1065/1 to /9 (2012)

IN

1982

Ind. Code Ann. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (LexisNexis 2013)

IA

1990

Iowa Code §§ 550.1 to .8 (2013)

KS

1981

Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-3320 to -3330 (2005)

KY

1990

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 365.880 to .900 (LexisNexis 2008)

LA

1981

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:1431 to 1439 (2012)

ME

1987

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, §§ 1541-1548 (2013)

MD

1989

Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (LexisNexis 2013)

MA

n/a

MI

1998

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.1901 to .1910 (West 2002)

MN

1980

Minn. Stat. §§ 325C.01 to .08 (2012)

MS

1990

Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-26-1 to -19 (2009)

MO

1995

Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 417.450 to .467 (2000)

n/a

MT

1985

Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (2013)

NE

1988

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 87-501 to -507 (2008)

NV

1987

Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 600A.010 to .100 (LexisNexis 2010)
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State

Year
Enacted

NH

1989

NJ

2012

N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:15-1 to -9 (West 2012)

NM

1989

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (West 2003)

NY

n/a

n/a

NC

n/a*

n/a

ND

1983

N.D. Cent. Code §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (2014)

OH

1994

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1333.61 to .69 (LexisNexis 2012)

OK

1986

Okla. Stat. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (2011)

OR

1987

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 646.461 to .475 (West 2011)

PA

2004

12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5301-5308 (West Supp. 2014)

RI

1986

R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (2001)

SC

1997

S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-8-10 to -130 (Supp. 2013)

SD

1988

S.D. Codified Laws §§ 37-29-1 to-11 (2004)

TN

2000

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-25-1701 to -1709 (2013)

TX

2013

2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 12–14

UT

1989

Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-24-1 to -9 (LexisNexis 2013)

VT

1995

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 4601-4609 (2006); id. tit. 12, § 523 (2002)

VA

1986

Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (West 2011)

WA

1981

Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.108.010 to .940 (2012)

WV

1986

W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 47-22-1 to -10 (LexisNexis 2006)

WI

1985

Wis. Stat. § 134.90 (2011–12)

WY

2006

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-24-101 to -110 (2013)

Citation
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 350-B:1 to -B:9 (LexisNexis 2008)

* See supra text note 247 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX B: STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR TRADE SECRET
MISAPPROPRIATION

State

Statute of
Limitations

AL

2 years

Ala. Code § 8-27-5 (LexisNexis 2002)

AK

3 years

Alaska Stat. § 45.50.925 (2012)

AZ

3 years

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-406 (2013)

AR

3 years

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-603 (2011)

CA

3 years

Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.6 (Deering 2005)

CO

3 years

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-74-107 (2014)

CT

3 years

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-56 (2013)

DE

3 years

Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2006 (2013)

DC

3 years

D.C. Code § 36-406 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2014)

FL

3 years

Fla. Stat. § 688.007 (2013)

GA

5 years

Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-766 (2009)

HI

3 years

Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 482B-7 (LexisNexis 2012)

ID

3 years

Idaho Code Ann. § 48-805 (2014)

IL

5 years

765 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 1067/7 (2012)

IN

3 years

Ind. Code Ann. § 24-2-3-7 (LexisNexis 2013)

IA

3 years

Iowa Code § 550.8 (2013)

KS

3 years

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3325 (2005)

KY

3 years

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.890 (LexisNexis 2008)

LA

3 years

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1436 (2012)

ME

4 years

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 1547 (2013)

MD

3 years

Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 11-1206 (LexisNexis 2013)

MA

3 years

Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics,
Inc., 412 F.3d 215, 238–39 (1st Cir. 2005)

MI

3 years

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.1907 (West 2002)

MN

3 years

Minn. Stat. § 325C.06 (2012)

MS

3 years

Miss. Code Ann. § 75-26-13 (2009)

MO

5 years

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 417.461 (2000)

MT

3 years

Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-407 (2013)

Citation
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State

Statute of
Limitations

NE

4 years

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-506 (2008)

NV

3 years

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 600A.080 (LexisNexis 2010)

NH

3 years

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 350-B:6 (LexisNexis 2008)

NJ

3 years

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:15-8 (West 2012)

NM

3 years

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3A-7 (West 2003)

NY

3 years

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(4) (Consol. 1999)

NC

3 years

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-157 (2013)

ND

3 years

N.D. Cent. Code § 47-25.1-06 (2014)

OH

4 years

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.66 (LexisNexis 2012)

OK

3 years

Okla. Stat. tit. 78, § 91 (2011)

OR

3 years

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 646.471 (West 2011)

PA

3 years

12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5307 (West Supp. 2014)

RI

3 years

R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-41-6 (2001)

SC

3 years

S.C. Code Ann. § 39-8-70 (Supp. 2013)

SD

3 years

S.D. Codified Laws § 37-29-6 (2004)

TN

3 years

Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1707 (2013)

TX

3 years

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.010 (West 2002)

UT

3 years

Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-7 (LexisNexis 2013)

VT

3 years

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 523 (2002)

VA

3 years

Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-340 (West 2011)

WA

3 years

Wash. Rev. Code § 19.108.060 (2012)

WV

3 years

W. Va. Code Ann. § 47-22-6 (LexisNexis 2006)

WI

3 years

Wis. Stat. § 893.51(2) (2011–12)

WY

4 years

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-24-106 (2013)

Citation

